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ABSTRACT 
 
Antecedents to Financial Statement Misreporting: 
The Influence of Organizational Business Strategy, Ethical Culture and Climate.  
(August 2012)  
Kathleen A. Bentley, B.S.B.A., University of Dayton; 
M.B.A., Franciscan University of Steubenville 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Michael S. Wilkins 
 
 Using organizational theory, this research study examines whether a firm‘s 
business strategy influences the ethical culture and climate within the organization, and 
thus explains why a firm‘s business strategy may ultimately contribute toward an 
increased risk of financial misreporting. This study develops from recent research which 
finds that companies following an innovative, risk-oriented Prospector business strategy 
are significantly more likely to experience financial reporting irregularities, despite 
increased audit effort levels. To examine the research question, both survey and archival 
methods are employed. 
Using a large-scale research survey, I find two subset groups of Prospector firms 
where a smaller (larger) group is significantly associated with a less (more) ethical 
culture and climate, which offer insights into why companies following a Prospector 
business strategy continue to experience irregularities despite auditors‘ efforts. Results 
suggest auditors may not be able to distinguish between the two sets of Prospectors and 
 iv 
thus may direct higher audit efforts too generally at Prospector firms rather than at the 
smaller set of firms with less ethical cultures and climates—i.e., firms more prone to 
rationalizing less ethical behavior. I also find that firms pursing a second type of 
strategy, a transitory Reactor strategy, are consistently associated with a negative ethical 
culture and climate.  
For a subset of public companies which can be linked to archival data, I find 
evidence to suggest that companies with less (more) ethical climates are associated with 
an increased (reduced) risk of financial misreporting while controlling for incentive and 
opportunity factors. I continue to find evidence that companies following a Prospector 
business strategy are associated with greater risks of misreporting, confirming prior 
research. Altogether, my findings suggest several antecedents for firms experiencing 
greater risk of financial statement misreporting and provide evidence regarding the third 
leg of the auditing fraud triangle (rationalization).  
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This dissertation follows the style of Contemporary Accounting Research. 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 This research study examines whether a firm‘s organizational business strategy 
influences its ethical culture and climate, thus explaining why a firm‘s business strategy 
may ultimately contribute toward an increased risk of financial misreporting. Business 
strategy defines how a company competes within its industry (Hambrick 1983). 
Organizational culture refers to a pattern of shared beliefs and expectations within an 
organization and is long-term in nature while climate refers to attitudes or perceptions 
within an organization and is relatively short-term and transitory in nature (Schwartz and 
Davis 1981; Treviño, Butterfield, and McCabe 1998). The risk of financial statement 
misreporting refers to the likelihood that financial statement information contains false 
or misleading information. I develop and test a conceptual model linking organizational 
business strategy to the risk of financial statement misreporting based on Cohen‘s 1995 
model for understanding how criminal business practices arise in organizations. I adapt 
Cohen‘s model to incorporate the fraud triangle theory (Cressey 1953) used by 
Statement on Auditing Standard No. 99 (SAS No. 99) (American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants [AICPA] 2002). 
Using Miles and Snow‘s (1978, 2003) organizational theory, recent research 
studies have linked firms following certain business strategies to aggressive financial 
reporting behavior (Higgins, Omer, and Phillips 2011; Bentley, Omer, and Sharp 2012).  
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Specifically, companies following an innovative, risk-oriented Prospector strategy are 
more likely both to experience financial reporting irregularities, despite increased audit 
effort levels (Bentley et al. 2012) and to be more tax aggressive (Higgins et al. 2011). 
The current study seeks to determine whether the choice of business strategy is 
associated with the development of less ethical organizational cultures and climates 
within organizations. I expect to provide some insight into why a company‘s business 
strategy may ultimately contribute toward an increased risk of financial misreporting. 
This study is motivated by Zahra, Priem, and Rasheed‘s 2005 concern that ―accounting 
research, by and large, has focused on identifying potential indicators or ‗red flags‘ 
rather than establishing direct causes or antecedents [of financial statement 
misreporting]‖ (813).   
This study is also motivated by Hogan et al.‘s 2008 call for more research in 
analyzing SAS No. 99’s third fraud risk factor: the attitudes of a company‘s 
directors/managers/employees toward financial reporting, and their ability to rationalize 
fraudulent behavior (i.e., ―attitudes/rationalizations‖).  Despite the lack of evidence in 
academic research (Hogan et al. 2008), anecdotal evidence suggests that management‘s 
attitudes and rationalization or ―tone at the top‖ is of primary importance in establishing 
and maintaining an effective control environment (Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) 1999; Hermanson, Ivancevich, and 
Ivancevich 2008).  Results from PricewaterhouseCoopers‘ (2009, 13) global fraud 
survey emphasize the importance of ―tone at the top‖ when they suggest ―fundamental to 
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the fight against fraud is the attitude and ethical stance demonstrated by those at the top 
[and] if organizations want to get the ‗tone at the top‘ right, senior executives need to be 
better informed about the fraud risks they are facing‖.  
An organization‘s ethical climate may provide insight into management‘s 
attitudes toward financial reporting (i.e., ―tone at the top‖) because ethical climate 
captures the shared perceptions or collective attitudes of individuals within the 
organization (James, James, and Ashe 1990; Kopelman, Brief, and Guzzo 1990) 
regarding ethical policies and may be the vehicle through which fraudulent behavior is 
rationalized (as implied by theoretical frameworks—e.g., Cohen 1995; Murphy and 
Dacin 2011). I use ethical climate as a proxy for SAS No. 99’s third fraud risk factor 
(attitudes/rationalizations) and examine whether ethical climate and culture mediate the 
relationship between business strategy and the risk of material financial misstatement 
while controlling for a firm‘s incentives and opportunities to misreport.  Using ethical 
climate as a proxy for management‘s tone toward financial reporting appears reasonable 
because risk factors reflective of SAS No. 99’s third leg of the fraud triangle include 
―ineffective communication, implementation, support, or enforcement of the entity‘s 
values or ethical standards by management or the communication of inappropriate values 
or ethical standards‖ (AICPA 2002, AU §316.85). Furthermore, the ethical climate 
literature consistently finds evidence that the ethical philosophies and value systems 
perpetuated by management significantly impact organizational behavior (refer to Martin 
and Cullen‘s 2006 meta-analysis), and a few studies find that the ethical climate or 
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management‘s tone specifically impacts financial reporting decisions (e.g., D‘Aquila 
2003; Murphy, Free, and Branson 2011).  
Drawing from prior organizational theory (e.g., Miles and Snow 1978, 2003; 
Victor and Cullen 1987, 1988; Joyce and Slocum 1990), I hypothesize that firms 
following two types of business strategies (Prospectors and Reactors) are at greater risk 
of developing negative ethical cultures and ethical climates, which are in turn linked 
with less ethical organizational behavior (e.g., Treviño et al. 1998; Martin and Cullen 
2006). I use surveys to collect information on organizational business strategies, ethical 
cultures and climates from a broad cross-section of companies. I first analyze the 
relationship between each of Miles and Snow‘s (1978, 2003) four business strategies 
(Prospectors, Defenders, Analyzers, and Reactors) and the types of ethical cultures and 
climates evident in those organizations. My findings broadly suggest that firms‘ business 
strategies are associated with the evolution of ethical cultures and climates. Further 
analysis shows that the relationship between a firm‘s strategy and its ethical climate is 
directly mediated by the firm‘s ethical culture.  
I find that firms following a Prospector business strategy generate different 
ethical cultures and climates. A relatively small set of Prospector firms develops a less 
ethical culture and climate (consistent with theoretical expectations) while a larger set of 
Prospector firms develops a more ethical culture and climate. This result provides insight 
into why Bentley et al. 2012 find that Prospectors continue to experience financial 
irregularities despite the increased auditor effort that tends to be associated with these 
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higher risk firms. While auditors may be able to distinguish business strategies and the 
differences in their risks as suggested by Bentley et al. 2012, auditors may not be able to 
distinguish between Prospectors with different types of ethical cultures and climates. 
Thus, the increase in audit effort directed at Prospector clients may be too generally 
applied rather than directed at the set of Prospectors with negative ethical cultures and 
climates—i.e., firms more prone to rationalizing less ethical behavior.  Comparatively, I 
find that the smaller set of less ethical Prospectors have lower levels of employee job 
satisfaction and organizational commitment, suggesting that auditors may need to pay 
particular attention to Prospector clients with these attributes. I also find that firms 
pursuing a transitory Reactor strategy are associated with negative ethical cultures and 
climates. Thus, I provide evidence of a factor that may help explain why the Reactor 
strategy is not considered viable in the long-term (Miles and Snow 1978, 2003). 
Using the relationship between a firm‘s business strategy and its ethical climate 
and culture established from my survey data, I investigate, for a subset of public 
companies, the relation between a firm‘s business strategy, ethical climate and culture, 
and the risk of financial misreporting. I use a risk measure developed by Audit Integrity 
(Accounting and Governance Risk) that represents the likelihood that financial 
statements contain false or misleading information. I provide evidence linking firms with 
less (more) ethical climates to increased (reduced) risks of financial misreporting, while 
controlling for firms‘ incentives and opportunities to misreport. Thus, ethical climate 
may be an important factor in the rationalization aspect of the fraud triangle and likely 
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provides incremental information beyond the incentive and opportunity aspects. I 
continue to find evidence that Prospector firms have higher risks of financial 
misreporting, consistent with Bentley et al.‘s 2012 results. Finally, in sensitivity tests I 
find evidence that validates the Bentley et al. archival strategy measure classifications of 
business strategy. 
This study makes three contributions to both the accounting and management 
literatures. First, although theory predicts an association between organizational 
strategies and ethical cultures and climates, there is little empirical research to support 
these predictions. My study provides empirical evidence linking specific strategies to 
certain ethical culture and climate dimensions.  Second, using a combination of survey 
and external archival measures, I provide insight into why recent research (i.e., Higgins 
et al. 2011; Bentley et al. 2012) finds a significant association between certain business 
strategies and aggressive reporting behavior. Specifically, I find that certain business 
strategies appear to cultivate less ethical cultures and climates.  Finally, I provide some 
evidence that companies with less ethical climates (i.e., a proxy for the third fraud risk 
factor under SAS No. 99) are more prone to financial misreporting while companies with 
more ethical climates are less prone to financial misreporting. Altogether, my study 
provides empirical support for a theoretical framework identifying why business strategy 
is an underlying antecedent for financial statement misreporting by linking business 
strategy to an organization‘s ethical culture and climate (a proxy for the third and final 
risk factor under SAS No. 99). 
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 develops my 
theoretical framework and hypotheses. Chapter 3 describes my model and measures. 
Chapter 4 describes my methodology and data. Chapter 5 describes my empirical results 
while Chapter 6 provides additional analysis. Chapter 7 provides my concluding 
remarks. 
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CHAPTER II 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Conceptual Framework 
Figure 1 provides a theoretical framework linking organizational business 
strategy, ethical culture, ethical climate, and the risk of deviant organizational behavior.
1
 
This framework is based on Cohen‘s 1995 model for understanding how criminal 
business practices arise in organizations and has been adapted to incorporate the fraud 
triangle theory (Cressey 1953) used by SAS No. 99 (AICPA 2002).  Cohen‘s (1995) 
model is rooted in Merton‘s sociological anomie theory dating from 1938, which 
emphasizes that social structures are important determinants in explaining non-
conforming behavior.
2
  
 
                                                 
1
 Deviant organizational behavior can be used synonymously with the term ―unethical business practices‖, 
which refers to ―intentional actions, committed on behalf of the organization, that violate  social contracts 
and result in harm to the firm‘s constituents‖ (Cohen 1995, 184)—e.g., lying, stealing, and falsifying 
reports (refer to Martin and Cullen‘s 2006 meta-analysis). 
 
2
 Although other theorists argue that criminal motivations are due to individual biological characteristics, 
Cohen provides a counterargument discussion. For instance, strong empirical evidence suggests that 
criminal behaviors are more prevalent when individuals feel frustrated within the social system; thus in an 
effort to predict criminal activity, ―it is certainly defensible to measure the degree to which individuals feel 
frustrated and disillusioned, regardless of which other variables one may also choose to assess‖ (Cohen 
1995, 193). Furthermore, Cohen argues that since ―individual institutions have distinct cultural values, 
norms, and beliefs agreed upon by members to... [where] typically, employees who disagree with 
management values, or who do not ‗fit in‘ to the culture ultimately leave the firm….information about an 
organization‘s value system can be extremely useful in predicting employee behavior‖ ‖ (193).  Refer to 
Cohen 1995 for a complete discussion. Similarly, Sims and Keon (1997) provide evidence that individuals 
are screened for an ‗ethical fit‘ within an organization, while Schneider (1987) using an Attraction-
Selection-Attrition framework suggest that certain types of people are attracted to particular settings and 
those individuals who do not ‗fit‘ will leave (Kopelman et al. 1990).   
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Figure 1. Theory representation. 
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Figure 1 (Continued) 
 
Notes: 
This conceptual theoretical framework is based on Cohen‘s 1995 framework for analyzing the antecedents on criminal 
business practices and the fraud triangle framework (Cressey 1953) as adopted by SAS No. 99 (AICPA 
2002). The dotted line indicates the primary linkages tested in this paper.  
 
Prior empirical research supports the following individual linkages: 
 
(1) [Miles and Snow 1978, 2003; Hambrick 1983] 
 (2) [Schwartz and Davis 1981; Kotter and Heskett 1992] 
(3) [Simons 1987; Bentley et al. 2012] 
(4) [Ittner et al. 1997; Rajagopalan 1997; Singh and Agarwal 2002; Bentley et al. 2012] 
(5) [Dechow et al. 1996; Summers and Sweeney 1998; Beneish 1999; Efendi et al. 2007] 
     (refer to Hogan et    al.‘s 2008 review) 
 (6) [Schwartz and Davis 1981; Kopelman et al. 1990; Treviño et al. 1998; Barnett and Vaicys 2000] 
(7) (refer to Cohen‘s 1995 theoretical model) 
(8) [Kopelman et al. 1990; Wimbush et al. 1997; Fritzsche 2000; Peterson 2002]  
      (refer to O‘Fallon and Butterfield‘s 2005 and Martin and Cullen‘s 2006 reviews) 
 (9) [Dechow et al. 1996; Beasley 1996; Dechow et al. 2011] 
      (refer to O‘Fallon and Butterfield‘s 2005 and Martin and Cullen‘s 2006 reviews) 
(10) [Dechow et al. 1996; Summers and Sweeney 1998; Beneish 1999; Dechow et al. 2011] 
                       (refer to Hogan et    al.‘s 2008 review) 
  
 
11 
Cohen (1995) applies Merton‘s theory to business organizations and outlines the 
following framework: social values influence management strategy, which influences 
organizational culture. Organizational culture then influences both the ethical climate 
and opportunity structure where the combination of a negative ethical climate and an 
opportunity structure results in deviant business practices. For example, the combination 
of a negative ethical climate, which focuses on advancing the organization‘s goals 
regardless of the consequences, with employees‘ perception that organization‘s goals can 
only be met using illegitimate means is likely to result in criminal business practices 
(Cohen 1995). In addition, a negative ethical climate can trigger a psychological 
response called ―anomie‖ through which deviant behavior is more likely to occur. 
Anomie describes a state where an individual experiences a sense of ―futility, alienation, 
powerlessness, and mistrust of the institution [which] are predicted to occur when 
individuals perceive the social system to be inconsistent and morally unstable, operating 
outside the framework of legitimate conduct‖ (Cohen 1995, 199). Because a negative 
ethical climate directly triggers a psychological anomie response, Cohen‘s framework 
appears to suggest that a negative ethical climate provides a mechanism through which 
deviant behavior can be rationalized.
3,4
  
                                                 
3
 Cohen (1995) describes anomie as a state of ―disillusionment‖, ―normlessness‖ or ―powerlessness‖. 
Disillusionment or detachment from the organization ―reduces the likelihood of making prosocial moral 
judgments [where] an inability to assume the stakeholder‘s point of view is often a critical factor in many 
business decisions with profoundly damaging consequences‖ (Cohen 1995, 190). Further, a sense of 
powerlessness (i.e., a perception that superiors cannot be challenged) is often linked to ―crimes of 
obedience‖ (Cohen 1995, 191). 
 
4
 Murphy and Dacin‘s (2011) ―psychological pathways to fraud‖ framework also identifies that a critical 
organizational attribute which affects whether an individual rationalizes fraudulent behavior is the 
organization‘s ethical climate. 
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Cohen‘s model appears to provide insight into antecedents of SAS No. 99‘s fraud 
risk framework (AICPA 2002), which collectively form the fraud triangle (Cressey 
1953). One can infer from Cohen‘s model that the incentive, opportunity, and 
rationalization mechanisms necessary for fraudulent behavior to occur are ultimately 
caused by an organization‘s strategy. In Figure 1, these three fraud risk factors are 
portrayed as antecedents directly influencing organizational behavior, consistent with 
SAS No. 99 (AICPA 2002). Recent research by Bentley et al. 2012 uses organizational 
theory to link organizational business strategies to incentive and opportunity fraud risk 
factors. This study attempts to directly link organizational business strategies to the third 
and final fraud risk factor (attitudes/rationalizations), thus addressing Hogan et al.‘s 
(2008) call for more research in this area. I specifically examine whether ethical climate, 
serving as a proxy for attitudes/rationalizations, mediates the relationship between 
business strategies and the risk of financial misreporting (as shown by the dotted arrows 
in Figure 1). I also consider that organizational ethical culture may serve as an additional 
mediator in this relationship as suggested by prior research.  
In the following subsections, I summarize the prior research that supports the 
individual linkages in Cohen‘s 1995 framework (as referenced in Figure 1) and then use 
this framework to develop my specific hypotheses.  
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Effects of Organizational Business Strategy on Ethical Culture and Climate  
  Prior organizational research (e.g., Schwartz and Davis 1981; Kopelman et al. 
1990; Kotter and Heskett 1992) suggests that organizational culture emerges directly 
from management strategy and that organizational climate then emerges from culture, 
supporting Cohen‘s (1995) model which shows that a firm‘s culture serves as a 
mediating variable between its strategy and climate (shown as linkages 2 and 6 in Figure 
1).
5
 Culture is concerned with ―a shared system of beliefs, expectations, and meanings‖ 
(Mirvis, and Sales 1990, 348) and is ―long-term and strategic‖ (Schwartz and Davis 
1981, 33) while climate ―reflects individual perceptions of the organization‖ (Rousseau 
1990, 159) and is ―transitory, tactical, and manageable over [the] relatively short term‖ 
(Schwartz and Davis 1981, 33).
6
 Treviño et al. (1998, 45) present a metaphor for 
distinguishing between climate and culture:  
The term ‘climate’ suggests meteorological climate and qualities such as 
temperature, humidity, precipitation, wind, and other atmospheric conditions 
that can affect individuals (e.g., feelings)… In this metaphorical sense, ethical 
climate may characterize organizations in terms of broad normative 
characteristics and qualities that tell people what kind of organization this is—
essentially what the organization values…[and so] is likely to be associated with 
                                                 
5
 Business strategy remains consistent for companies over time because of the development of ―certain 
internal consistencies…[which] tend to perpetuate the strategies‖ (Hambrick 1983, 7). Companies are 
reluctant to change their strategies because of the significant resources ―required to develop the distinctive 
competencies, technologies, structures, and management processes needed to pursue a particular 
strategy….[therefore] when faced with external change or pressure, [companies] tend to adjust rather than 
change their strategies‖ (Snow and Hambrick 1980, 529). Similarly, culture is generally consistent over 
time where any change is gradual (Thompson and Luthans 1990; Kotter and Heskett 1992).   
 
6
 Refer to Reichers and Schneider 1990 for an overview of how culture and climate evolve as two separate 
constructs.  
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attitudes….In contrast, the notion of ‘culture’ evokes notions of rules, codes, 
rewards, leadership, rituals…. [and] characterizes the organization in terms of 
formal and informal control systems (e.g., rules, reward systems, and norms)…  
 
 Although organizational theory suggests that business strategy directly influences 
culture and culture then influences climate, business strategies ultimately influence the 
types of climates that develop because the ―strategic context imposes a variety of choices 
and constraints on structure, processes, and control systems within organizations [where] 
the resulting structural differences across organizations…are hypothesized to yield 
collective climates with differing attributes in terms of consistency, consensus, and 
congruity‖ (Joyce and Slocum 1990, 145). Theoretically, Joyce and Slocum (1990) link 
each of the business strategies based on Miles and Snow‘s typology (Prospectors, 
Defenders, Analyzers, and Reactors) to specific organizational climate attributes (e.g., 
consensus, consistency and congruity).   
For instance, firms pursuing an efficiency-oriented Defender strategy (which 
strives for cost or quality leadership in a niche market), require the formation of a 
hierarchical, centralized decision-making organizational structure to achieve their 
strategic objectives (Miles and Snow 1978, 2003). Because Defenders‘ centralized/ 
bureaucratic organizational structure promotes adherence to the consistent application of 
rules and procedures over their heavily mechanized and routinized processes, 
organizational climate perceptions are expected to be highly consistent and collective 
where employees encounter the same ―reality‖ within the organization (Joyce and 
Slocum 1990). The founders of ethical climate theory, Victor and Cullen (1987, 1988), 
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make similar predictions by suggesting that traditionally bureaucratic, centralized 
organizations promote strong adherence to rules, laws and codes which fosters a 
principle-based ethical climate.  
Conversely, firms pursuing an innovative Prospector strategy (which strives for 
innovation in numerous product-market orientations), typically utilize decentralized 
decision-making in order to encourage risk-taking and creativity (Miles and Snow 1978, 
2003). Prospectors promote innovation through the use of multiple performance-based 
reward structures which, when combined with the failure to enforce adherence to any of 
these systems, results in low climate consistency and consensus where employees 
experience different ‗realities‘ within the same company.  Thus, Joyce and Slocum 
(1990) predict that Prospectors perpetuate an individualistic climate. Victor and Cullen 
(1988) make similar predictions by suggesting that firms with an entrepreneurial, 
innovative focus produce an individualistic, egoism-based ethical climate because ―self-
interested behavior is the social norm‖ (120).  
Joyce and Slocum (1990) predict that companies pursuing the hybrid Analyzer 
strategy (firms exhibiting characteristics of both Prospectors and Defenders—i.e., a mix 
of innovation and efficiency), promote organizational climates with a moderate degree 
of consensus and internal consistency. Because most organizational attributes in 
Analyzer firms are moderate (e.g., moderate formalization and moderate performance-
based reward structures), Joyce and Slocum (1990) suggest that ethical climate 
tendencies will also be moderate.  Therefore, I expect that since Analyzers appear 
neither as likely as Prospectors to display an  individualistic, egoism-based ethical 
  
 
16 
climate nor are as likely as Defenders to display a rule-oriented principle-based ethical 
climate, Analyzers likely produce a benevolence-based climate, which exists between 
the two climate extremes (egoism and principle). Benevolence climates emphasize 
making decisions in relation to a broad group of stakeholders (e.g., employees, 
customers and the community at large) (Victor and Cullen 1987, 1988).
7
 
Finally, companies employing the Reactor strategy (which only respond to 
environmental change and do not follow any internally consistent strategy) are expected 
to exhibit organizational climates with ―low degrees of consensus, high inconsistency, 
and a lack of congruity‖ because disagreement often arises about what and how things 
are accomplished (Joyce and Slocum 1990, 144). Joyce and Slocum (1990) posit that in 
situations where no agreement in climate perceptions exists, Reactors can actually 
become ―climateless‖ or ―normless‖ (i.e., analogous to Merton‘s theoretical state of 
‗anomie‘), which is an environmental prescription for criminal organizational behavior 
(Cohen 1995). Using organizational theory, Cohen 1995 specifically predicts that an 
individualistic, egoism-based ethical climate likely produces anomic organizations; 
therefore, Reactors, similar to Prospectors, are likely to foster an individualistic egoism-
based ethical climate. As discussed in detail in the next subsection, an egoism-based 
                                                 
7
 Victor and Cullen‘s ethical climate theory builds from Kohlberg‘s 1984 theory of moral development, in 
which individuals reach higher-levels of ethical reasoning as they progress from self-interested to 
principle-based reasoning (Fritzsche 2000). Victor and Cullen describe three primary types of ethical 
climate (egoism, benevolence, and principle) which are based on the ethics criterion that people use to 
make decisions. Victor and Cullen then further subdivide the ethical climates into the ‗locus of analysis‘ 
(e.g., perspective) used as a referent in decision-making (individual, local and cosmopolitan). Therefore 
there are actually nine theoretical climates (3 ethics criterion intersected with 3 locus of analysis)--see 
Figure 2, panel A. Cohen (1995, 188) indicates that ―norms of the local reference group are expected to 
exert the strongest impact on behavior [because] for many business professionals, the firm becomes the 
principal local referent‖ (emphasis added).   
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ethical climate is the only type of climate consistently linked to less ethical 
organizational behavior (see Martin and Cullen 2006 for a review).  
In summary, prior theoretical research (e.g., Victor and Cullen 1978, 1988; Joyce 
and Slocum 1990; Cohen 1995) suggests that Prospectors and Reactors will exhibit 
individualistic, egoism-based ethical climates in direct contrast to tendencies of 
Defenders to exhibit a rule-oriented, principle-based ethical climate and Analyzers‘ 
tendencies to perpetuate more moderate and likely benevolence-based ethical climates.
8
  
Although business strategies are expected to ultimately influence the development of 
ethical climates within organizations, organizational culture likely mediates this 
relationship as suggested by Cohen‘s 1995 model and other theoretical research  (e.g., 
Schwartz and Davis 1981; Kopelman et al. 1990; Kotter and Heskett 1992). Therefore, I 
formally state my first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Business strategies are associated with organizational ethical 
climates after controlling for ethical culture. 
To complete testing of the conceptual framework shown in Figure 1, I describe 
how organizational business strategy may be the primary antecedent linking culture, 
climate, and the remaining factors (i.e., opportunities and incentives) to the risk of 
irregular financial reporting.  
                                                 
8
 Miles and Snow (1994) describe examples of different business strategies. For instance, within the 
computer/electronics industry, National Semiconductor, a Defender, focuses ―narrowly on efficient chip 
production utilizing advanced process technologies‖ (14) while Hewlett-Packard, a Prospector, pursues 
product lines only while the company has a ―distinct technological or design advantage‖ but abandons this 
arena when products reach the stage of competing on price (33). IBM, an Analyzer, has a complex matrix 
organization which allows them to ―achieve global efficiency as well as local responsiveness‖ (36). 
Finally, a high proportion of Reactors (i.e., firms lacking ―strategy, structure, and process fit‖) were 
present in the airline industry prior to deregulation, which failed or went bankrupt (e.g., Pan Am) without 
governmental protection (77).  
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Organizational Business Strategy, Ethical Culture and Climate as Antecedents to 
Financial Misreporting 
Bentley et al. (2012) provide some empirical support for the beginning and end 
points of Cohen‘s 1995 model by linking certain organizational business strategies with 
significantly more frequent financial reporting irregularity occurrences. Using Miles and 
Snow‘s (1978, 2003) business typology, Bentley et al. (2012) find that firms following 
an innovative Prospector strategy are more likely to experience financial reporting 
irregularities compared to firms following the other two viable business strategies (i.e., 
Defenders and Analyzers). Miles and Snow‘s (1978, 2003) organizational theory 
suggests business strategies influence multiple facets of the organization, which Bentley 
et al. (2012) suggest include organizational characteristics consistent with two of SAS 
No. 99‘s fraud risk factors—incentives and opportunities to misreport. For instance, 
Bentley et al. (2012) describe how Prospector companies‘ characteristics embody several 
of the following SAS No. 99 incentive risk factors: the propensity to grow rapidly and 
sporadically, to encounter lower profitability more frequently, and to engage in riskier 
compensation incentives (e.g., Miles and Snow 1973, 2003; Hambrick 1983; Ittner, 
Larcker, and Rajan 1997; Rajagopalan 1997; Singh and Agarwal 2002).
 
Furthermore, 
Prospector firms have complex organizational designs and lack organizational stability, 
both of which are opportunity-related risk factors (AICPA 2002).  
This study attempts to establish organizational business strategy as an underlying 
antecedent for all three SAS No. 99 fraud risk factors by using ethical climate to proxy 
for the third fraud risk factor (attitudes/rationalizations). Using ethical climate as a 
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proxy for this third risk factor appears reasonable because risk factors reflective of SAS 
No. 99’s third leg of the fraud triangle include: ―ineffective communication, 
implementation, support, or enforcement of the entity‘s values or ethical standards by 
management or the communication of inappropriate values or ethical standards‖ (AICPA 
2002, AU §316.85). A recent working paper by Murphy et al. 2011, using a sample of 
witnesses and perpetrators of fraudulent activity (e.g., fraudulent reporting and asset 
misappropriation), find a significant correlation between individual rationalization 
measures and ethical climate measures (specifically those associated with an egoism-
based climate), thus giving some empirical support for the use of ethical climate as a 
proxy for SAS No. 99‘s third fraud risk factor (attitudes/rationalizations).9 
One explanation for why Prospectors engage in aggressive reporting behavior 
(e.g., financial reporting irregularities; tax aggressiveness) may be that these firms also 
develop ethical cultures and climates that perpetuate this type of aggressive behavior. 
Specifically, Prospectors, due to their innovative, risk-taking focus and decentralized 
organizational structure, appear more likely to perpetuate an egoism-based climate, 
which is the only type of climate shown to be positively related to deviant organizational 
                                                 
9
 Murphy et al. (2011) specifically find that the rationalization measures most strongly correlated with an 
egoism-based climate include rationalizing the behavior by placing blame on the organization (e.g., the 
fraud suspect rationalized their behavior because s/he was instructed to perform the fraudulent action, was 
helping the company or was performing a similar fraudulent act as others within the company).  In 
addition, Murphy and Dacin‘s (2011) psychological framework identifies that an organization‘s ethical 
climate is a critical attribute which affects whether an individual is able to rationalize fraudulent behavior. 
However, ethical climate, an organizational-level construct is separate from individual-level 
rationalization (Murphy et al. 2011).  
 
  
 
20 
behavior such as lying, stealing and falsifying reports (Martin and Cullen 2006).
10
 
Theoretically, self-interested egoism-based climates should be associated with less 
ethical behavior, whereas rule-oriented principle-based climates should be associated 
with ethical behavior, consistent with both Wimbush and Shepard‘s 1994 conceptual 
model and Kohlberg‘s 1984 theory of moral development (Treviño et al. 1998; Fritzsche 
2000). In egoism-based climates ―flagrant types of crime, such as fraud and outright 
deception, may be more likely to occur‖ (Cullen, Victor, and Stephens 1989, 60) because 
―individuals are less likely to weight the interests of others…or rules, laws and 
codes…when making decisions regarding ethical dilemmas‖ (Barnett and Vaicys 2000, 
354). An organization which is less likely to consider ―rules, laws and codes‖ in 
decision-making is identified by SAS No. 99 as an organization more at risk of fraudulent 
activity where ―known history of violations of securities laws or other laws and 
regulations, claims against the entity, its senior management, or board members alleging 
fraud or violations of laws and regulations‖ (AICPA 2002, AU §316.85) are specific risk 
factors reflective of the third leg of the fraud triangle (attitudes/rationalizations).  
Appelbaum, Deguire, and Lay‘s (2005) review on deviant behavior indicates that 
turnover is higher in deviant firms while Ferrell and Skinner (1988) find that 
centralization is related to higher perceived ethical behavior. Because Prospectors are 
both more likely to experience significant management turnover and also be 
decentralized (Miles and Snow 1978, 2003), this lends additional structural evidence for 
                                                 
10
 Note that the prior section also indicates that firms following a second type of strategy, a transitory 
Reactor strategy, are also likely to be associated with an egoism-based climate (e.g., Joyce and Slocum 
1990; Cohen 1995). 
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Prospectors to exhibit more deviant organizational behavior. In addition, because 
innovative firms are also more likely to deemphasize adherence to rules and procedures 
(Victor and Cullen 1987, 1988), I expect Prospectors to deemphasize ethics code 
implementation compared to rule-oriented Defenders (where code implementation is an 
ethical cultural element).
11
 Cohen (1995) posits that a difference between organizations 
likely to perpetuate deviant behavior is in the implementation of the ethics code where 
―in highly anomic institutions…codes are often poorly distributed and inadequately 
enforced, communicating to employees that management is not genuinely serious about 
their implications‖ (197).  Anecdotally, it is interesting to note that Enron‘s board of 
directors allowed management to violate the firm‘s written ethics code. Specifically, 
―Enron‘s board of directors voted three times to suspend the conflict of interest 
provisions in Enron‘s code of ethics to permit CFO Andrew Fastow to establish and 
operate entities that transacted business with Enron and profited at Enron‘s expense‖ 
(Schwartz, Dunfee, and Kline 2005, 85).
12
 
 Conversely, an ethical climate characterized by benevolence-based ideals factors 
concern for others into the ethical decision-making process (e.g., employees, customers, 
and other stakeholders) and thus should result in less ethically questionable behavior 
                                                 
11
 Ethical culture elements include formal mechanisms like reward and punishment structures and 
procedures for implementing an organizational ethical code; ethical culture also includes informal 
elements such as rigid authority structures where subordinates feel unable to challenge authority figures 
and ethics codes inconsistent with organizational norms (i.e., ethics code to maintain a public image) 
(Treviño et al. 1998).  
 
12
 Enron appeared to be a Prospector firm with an egoism-based climate. Enron was known for innovation 
and risk-taking, promoted ―self-interest above any other interest‖ and focused on ―winning-at-all costs…. 
with little regard to ethics‖ (Sims and Brinkmann 2005, 250). For example, a former Enron vice president 
in describing Enron‘s reward structure remarked that: ―The moral of this story is break the rules, you can 
cheat, you can lie, but as long as you make money, it‘s all right‖ (Sims and Brinkmann 2005, 250). 
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(Barnett and Vaicys 2000). Similarly, an ethical climate characterized by principle-based 
ideals should result in more ethical decisions because relatively inflexible principles of 
right or wrong (e.g., professional ethics codes or societal regulations regarding ethics) 
are fostered into the ethical decision-making process (Barnett and Vaicys 2000).
13
 
Martin and Cullen‘s (2006) meta-analysis on the ethical climate literature reveals that 
ethical climates based in benevolence and principle ideals are negatively correlated with 
deviant organizational behaviors.  
As discussed in the previous section, Analyzers are expected to have 
benevolence-based climates while Defenders are expected to have principle-based 
climates. Since neither of these types of climates is expected to be negatively associated 
with deviant behavior, the organizational literature provides further support for why 
Bentley et al. (2012) find that neither Analyzers nor Defenders are more likely to 
experience financial reporting irregularities. Further, bureaucratic Defender-like firms 
which are oriented toward principle-based ethical climates (Joyce and Slocum 1990) 
may be more likely to use rigid authority structures to enforce strong adherence to 
ethical rules and procedures. Note that Cohen (1995) suggests that rigid authority 
structures are only negative cultural attributes in situations where employees feel 
pressured by management to violate the law.
14
 
                                                 
13
 However, Cullen, Victor, and Stephens (1989) indicate there are still risks of unethical behavior in other 
types of climates besides those climates rooted in egoism. For instance, employees in a benevolent climate 
may offer a bribe when faced with losing a contract because the contract may help others in the firm. 
Employees in a rules-oriented climate may downplay their individual judgment, which could lead to a 
conflict between various rules and regulations. 
 
14
 Anecdotally, WorldCom provides anecdotal evidence where drivers for fraudulent behavior included ―a 
systematic attitude conveyed from the top down that employees should not question their superiors, but 
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In conclusion, both theoretical and empirical research associate firms that display 
individualistic, egoism-based climates (e.g., likely Prospector and Reactor type firms) 
with deviant organizational behaviors while associating firms that display either 
benevolence- or principle-oriented climates (e.g., likely Analyzer and Defender type 
firms) with more ethical organizational behaviors. Altogether, Cohen‘s (1995) model 
suggests that the relationship between business strategy and deviant organizational 
behavior is mediated by both ethical culture and climate. Based on Hogan et al.‘s 2008 
review of the fraud literature, both opportunity and incentive factors are found to be 
strongly associated with financial misstatement. Thus, to test whether ethical climate 
(serving as a proxy for attitudes/rationalizations) and ethical culture mediate the 
relationship between business strategy and the risk of financial misstatement and is not 
confounded by relevant opportunity and incentive factors, I control for all these factors 
in the model. Formally I state my hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Ethical climate (as a proxy for the third fraud risk factor, 
attitudes/rationalizations) and ethical culture mediate the relationship between 
business strategy and the risk of financial misstatement, after controlling for 
opportunity and incentive factors.  
                                                                                                                                                
simply do what they were told‖ (WorldCom‘s 2003 Directors‘ Report as quoted by Schwartz et al. 2005, 
80). 
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CHAPTER III 
MODEL AND MEASURES 
 
Main Model 
I examine whether ethical culture and climate significantly mediate the 
relationship between organizational business strategy and the risk of financial 
misstatement, while controlling for relevant opportunity and incentive factors. The 
measures for my model are obtained using a combination of survey and archival data. 
The primary theoretical model is as follows: 
Risk of financial misstatement = f(Business Strategy, Ethical Culture, Ethical 
Climate, Opportunity, Incentive, Controls)     (1) 
Measures 
Risk of financial misstatement 
My dependent variable is the Accounting and Governance Risk (AGR) measure 
produced by Audit Integrity. This measure is constructed from publicly available 
information, and is intended to represent the likelihood that financial information 
contains false or misleading information (refer to Price, Sharp, and Wood 2011). AGR is 
scored discretely from 0 (high risk of material misstatement) to 100 (low risk of material 
misstatement) and, similar to Price et al. 2011, I reverse score the measure such that 
higher scores represent greater risks of financial statement misreporting. 
I use the Audit Integrity risk measure over alternative measures for several 
reasons. First, I use an archival rather than a survey measure to represent financial 
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misreporting risk because asking participants to disclose fraudulent or irregular reporting 
behavior would incriminate survey participants and thus is not permissible.
15
 Even if it 
were permissible to ask these types of survey questions, answers would likely be 
severely biased if participants feared retaliation for reporting sensitive information. 
Second, I use these measures because the infrequency of actual financial statement 
irregularities that align with my survey sample would limit my ability to test any 
association underlying my hypotheses.
16
 Audit Integrity‘s risk measure is available for a 
large cross-section of companies and is reported every year, including the year in which 
the surveys are conducted (e.g., 2010 or 2011 depending on the latest available set of 
financial statements). Finally, I use this measure rather than existing academic risk 
measures (e.g., Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney‘s (1996) modified Jones model; Dechow 
et al.‘s (2011) fraud score) because Price et al. (2011) find that Audit Integrity‘s AGR 
measure generally outperforms the academic measures in detecting and predicting 
financial reporting irregularities. Further, Daines, Gow, and Larcker (2010) find 
evidence that AGR also outperforms other commercial risk measures.
17
  
                                                 
15
 Special thanks to both workshop participants and an outside professional organization in identifying this 
problem. 
 
16
 Refer to Price et al. 2011 for evidence documenting the low frequencies of certain types of irregularities 
in recent years. 
 
17
 In addition, Bentley et al. (2012) find that their archival strategy measure is positive and significantly 
associated with AGR, thus providing additional evidence that firms following a Prospector strategy have a 
greater risk of financial misreporting. 
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Business strategy 
I develop firm strategy classifications based on my survey instrument.  I adapt 
Conant, Mokwa, and Varadarajan‘s (1990) 11-item validated scale, which captures the 
multi-dimensional attributes of Miles and Snow‘s (1978, 2003) business strategy 
typology.
18
 For each of the 11 strategy questions, participants select one of four options 
that best describe their organization relative to industry competitors where each of the 
options corresponds to a different strategy classification (Prospector, Defender, 
Analyzer, or Reactor). I classify an organization‘s overall business strategy following 
Conant et al.‘s (1990) ‗majority rule‘. For instance, if a participant answers the majority 
of the questions with a ‗Prospector‘ response, then the organization is classified as 
having an overall ‗Prospector‘ strategy.  
Ethical culture and climate 
I also use the survey instrument to obtain measures of an organization‘s ethical 
culture and climate. I use Treviño et al.‘s (1998) 21- item ethical culture scale and Victor 
and Cullen‘s (1987, 1988) 36-item ethical climate scale, which are empirically distinct 
(see Treviño et al. 1998). The ethical culture scale indicates how an organization 
implements its ethics code and how strongly authority figures are obeyed within the 
organization, and also identifies characteristics about the organization‘s overall ethical 
environment—e.g., whether ethical behavior is rewarded and unethical behavior is 
punished. The ethical climate scale indicates what the organization values that 
                                                 
18
 This scale was validated by Conant et al. 1990 using a panel of organizational theory and strategy 
experts and continues to be used in the management literature (e.g., DeSarbo et al. 2005; Song Di 
Benedetto, and Nason 2007). 
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corresponds to the ethics criterion that people use to make decisions (egoism, 
benevolence, and principle). For example, does the organization primarily value 
maximizing individual or company self-interest, fostering concern for a broad set of 
stakeholders (e.g., employees or customers), or requiring strong adherence to rules or 
external laws? All questions are measured using a 7-point Likert scale.   
Opportunity and incentive factors 
I collect archival data to control for the opportunity and incentive risk factors 
identified by the prior financial irregularity literature (e.g., Summers and Sweeney 1998; 
Beneish 1999; Dechow et al. 2011; Price et al. 2011; Bentley et al. 2012; McGuire, 
Omer, and Sharp 2012). Because Bentley et al. (2012) provide an extensive discussion 
linking business strategies to the relevant incentive and opportunity factors that are 
included in their irregularity model, I control for these same factors in my model.
19
 I 
control for firm size, profitability, growth, mergers and acquisitions, leverage, ex ante 
financing needs, industry type and concentration, discretionary accruals, and the 
presence of external monitors such as dedicated institutional investors and Big N audit 
firms.  
Other controls 
 Because prior research provides evidence that individual characteristics have a 
direct effect on ethical decision-making, I include the following individual 
characteristics obtained from the survey as controls in my model: gender, age, education, 
                                                 
19
 I do not control Bentley et al. (2012) firm age measure which uses the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) database because requiring the presence of this variable eliminates too many observations 
when aligned with the survey data.  However, if the Compustat database is used to compute firm age 
instead, results are robust (refer to sensitivity tests in Chapter 6).  
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tenure, and U.S. citizenship (McNichols and Zimmerer 1985; Ford and Richardson 
1994; Wimbush, Shepard, and Markham 1997). I control for job satisfaction and 
organizational commitment measures (measured using 7-point Likert scales) because 
Martin and Cullen‘s (2006) meta-analysis reveals that these measures may directly 
mediate the relationship between organizational ethical climate and dysfunctional 
behavior.
20
 Based on the findings in McGuire et al. 2012 that show an association 
between higher levels of religiosity and less frequent occurrences of financial reporting 
irregularities, I control for the survey participants‘ level of religiosity (measured using a 
7-point Likert scale).  I also control for other participant-related information—e.g., their 
position in the company and their department‘s responsibilities (accounting, finance, 
management, and marketing). Refer to Appendix A for a brief description of all of the 
survey and archival variables used in my model. 
                                                 
20
 I measure job satisfaction (JOB SATISFY) with a single item following Treviño et al. (1998). I measure 
organizational commitment with two items which capture different dimensions of organizational 
commitment: the extent to which the individual identifies with the organization‘s goals and attitudes 
(COMMIT 1) and internalizes the organization‘s perspective (COMMIT 2) (O‘Reilly and Chatman 1986; 
Treviño et al. 1998). 
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CHAPTER IV 
SURVEY METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
Survey Methodology 
I followed Dillman‘s (1978) ―total design approach‖ recommendations to 
develop my survey instrument and to maximize response rates. I first pre-tested the 
instrument with research colleagues and then pilot-tested it with people drawn from the 
actual survey population.
21
 I conducted my survey using two approaches: via the Internet 
and mail.
22
 The purpose of the survey approach conducted via the Internet was to reach a 
broad network of business professionals (e.g., staff, managers, and executives) in a 
variety of industries and firms (e.g., public and private), thus improving the 
generalizability of the results. I rely on this survey data exclusively to test my first 
hypothesis, which examines the association among business strategies, ethical climates 
and cultures. The Internet survey was conducted through the access of two 
organizations: the Institute of Management Accountants (IMA) and a large, public 
university‘s alumni center with relevant survey populations of 5,000 and 4,600, 
                                                 
21
 I pre-tested my survey instrument in a research workshop setting at another institution. After 
implementing the suggested changes, I pre-tested the instrument again among several other research 
colleagues. I conducted a pilot study through a university alumni center and received 107 survey responses 
(representing a 9 percent response rate).  
 
22
 The survey instruments conducted via the Internet and mail are identical except that the Internet survey 
is conducted anonymously while the mail survey contains coded company identifiers to link survey 
responses to archival data. Internet survey participants have the option to voluntarily disclose the name of 
their organization at the conclusion of the survey. Approximately 37 percent of participants provide 
voluntary disclosure where over 50 of these responses can be linked to archival data. In addition, because 
the mail survey responses are linked to archival data, questions related to firm size and industry 
classification are omitted on the survey and are obtained via public data. The survey instrument is 
presented in Appendix B.  
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respectively.
23
 The Internet survey was commenced on September 9, 2011 and held open 
for a three week period. I received a 7 percent overall response rate with a higher 
response rate via the university alumni center (11.5 percent) than via the IMA (4.0 
percent).
24
 The overall response rate is consistent with several other accounting/finance 
research studies; for instance, Trahan and Gitman (1995), Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal 
(2005), and Graham and Harvey (2001) have 12 percent, 10 percent and 9 percent 
response rates, respectively.   
I also collected mail-based survey data allowing surveys to be coded with 
company identifiers, thus providing a link between survey responses and archival data 
(e.g., AGR risk measure). I supplement my mail-based survey data with Internet survey 
observations where participants voluntarily disclosed the name of their organization and 
these organizations are included in my archival dataset. I use this archival-linked survey 
data to test how business strategy, ethical culture and climate are related to the archival 
AGR risk measure (i.e., testing Hypothesis 2). In sensitivity tests, I compare an 
organization‘s strategy classification via survey results to Bentley et al.‘s 2012 archival 
strategy (STRATEGY) measure to test the validation of their measure. I randomly 
selected my mail-based survey sample based on a population intersecting both the AGR 
and STRATEGY datasets (see Price et al. (2011) and Bentley et al. (2012) for a 
description of these datasets, respectively).   
                                                 
23
 Although the university alumni center had a total relevant survey population of 4,600, 25 percent of this 
population is randomly selected to serve as the pilot study; therefore, the total relevant population is 3,450. 
 
24
 To increase response rates, both organizations directly sent their members a recruitment email 
containing the survey link and reminder emails were sent by both organizations the following week 
encouraging their members to participate. Financial incentives (i.e., an opportunity to win an iPad) were 
offered to survey participants.  
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I restricted the available population to observations in the merged AGR-
STRATEGY dataset to calendar year 2008 (the last overlapping year for both datasets). I 
then obtained updated AGR measures from Audit Integrity (now Risk Metrics) and 
STRATEGY measures (via replication of Bentley et al. 2012) for the years 2008 to 2011 
for these firms to facilitate comparison with my survey data.
25
  To identify and eliminate 
firms in the sample that were acquired by another company or were privatized since 
2008, I restricted observations to firms present and active in Compustat in fiscal year 
2010 (i.e., the last reporting period available on Compustat at the time I conducted my 
surveys). Finally, in an effort to improve response rates, my sample is restricted to 
organizations with a United States mailing address. My total potential sampling 
population is 2,007 companies.  Refer to Table 1, panel A for details on the mail-based 
survey selection. 
                                                 
25
 Note that Audit Integrity periodically updates how these risk measures are computed (see Price et al. 
2011). I allow the voluntarily disclosed Internet observations to match only current AGR measures and not 
the STRATEGY dataset (to maximize the archival-linked sample size) in my main analysis because the 
STRATEGY dataset is only used in sensitivity analysis. However, inferences remain the same if I use this 
additional restriction. 
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TABLE 1 
Survey data selection. 
 
Panel A: Sample selection for archival-linked mail survey sample 
Description Observations 
STRATEGY score dataset (Bentley et al. 2012) 57,517 firm-year observations 
Less: Firms present in AGR score dataset             
(Price et al. 2011) 
(27,380) firm-year observations 
Less: Firms prior to calendar year 2008  (27,811) firm observations 
Less: Firms inactive in or otherwise not present in 
Compustat as of fiscal year 2010  
(319) firm observations 
Total archival-based survey population 2,007 firm observations (calendar year 2008) 
Randomly selected survey sample 667 firm observations  (33% of archival population) 
 
 
  
Panel B: Usable survey sample responses for main analysis    
Description Internet  
survey 
Mail  
survey 
Total  
surveys 
Total survey sample 597 78 675 
Less observations with any missing data  
(listwise deletion) 
(13) (11) (24) 
Less observations with low confidence score in answering business 
strategy and/or ethical climate and culture questions  
(43) (2) (45) 
Less outlier observations (Mahalanobis distances) (29) (0) (29) 
Usable survey sample 512 65 577 
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I randomly selected 667 companies from my archival dataset (representing 33 
percent of the total dataset population) and mailed three surveys to each organization for 
a total of 2,000 surveys. Surveys were mailed to three departments (accounting, finance, 
and marketing) and were directed to the attention of the department heads—e.g., 
Controller, Chief Financial Officer or Director of Marketing.
26
 To increase response 
rates, a team of graduate business students obtained specific company contact 
information via the phone and Internet resources (e.g., company website, Edgar, and 
Hoovers) allowing approximately 90 percent of surveys mailed to be directed to specific 
individuals in the organization while the remaining 10 percent were directed to generic 
department title positions.
27
 Following Dillman‘s (1978) ―total design method‖ 
recommendations to increase response rates, I implemented a three-wave survey 
mailing. The first survey packet mailing was sent on September 21, 2011 with a 
reminder postcard mailing sent to all participants a week later. The final reminder survey 
packet mailing was sent to non-respondents on October 11, 2011. I received survey 
responses from 76 different companies, representing an 11 percent response rate from 
each of the 667 companies that were mailed surveys (or about a 4 percent overall 
response rate from the 2,000 total surveys mailed).  
                                                 
26
 I target respondents from the same firm in different firms to reduce potential measurement bias (Zahra 
and Pearce 1990; Golden 1997). In addition, ―multiple methods and sources can provide a means of 
validating strategy classifications‖ (Zahra and Pearce 1990, 761).  
 
27
 Approximately 50 companies contacted via the telephone indicated that company policy prohibits 
employees from participating in research surveys. These organizations were substituted randomly without 
replacement from the archival dataset. The bias likely is small due to the small percentage of non-
participating organizations (approximately 7 percent of the sample population) and also because these 
organizations may still be represented in the Internet surveys since those participants may have been 
unaware of their company‘s policy.  
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Data Cleansing 
Out of the 675 total survey responses received via the Internet and mail, 577 are 
usable responses after employing several data cleansing techniques (see Table 1, panel 
B). First, I employ listwise deletion by omitting observations with any missing data 
(Kline 2005, 53).
28
 Similar to prior research (e.g., Conant et al. 1990; DeSarbo et al. 
2005), I exclude observations where participants indicate low confidence in answering 
strategy and ethical culture and climate questions (i.e., where participants score below 6 
on an 11-point Likert scale). I also eliminate multivariate outlier observations identified 
using Mahalanobis distance (p-value <0.001), which is a common technique used to 
identify unusual response patterns in multivariate data (see Kline 2005, 51).
29
  
I randomized the order of the questions within blocks on the survey instrument to 
avoid order effects. For example, the business strategy questions appeared in random 
order in the first survey section while ethical climate questions appeared in random order 
in the second survey section. Using multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA), I find 
no statistical differences (p<0.05) in the main variables of interest (i.e., strategy, culture, 
and climate constructs) between the two mail-based survey versions. I do not formally 
test differences for the Internet surveys because the Internet-survey software program 
completely randomizes each survey that is sent. To test for potential non-response bias, 
                                                 
28
 Kline (2005) suggests that listwise deletion is appropriate if the data appear to be missing randomly and 
the missing observations constitute a very small percentage of the total responses. I find insignificant 
demographical differences between observations with missing data versus observations without missing 
data; further, the missing observations constitute only a small percentage of total responses.  
 
29
 In sensitivity tests I confirm that outliers are not heavily influencing my main Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regression results using robust regression (i.e., OLS coefficients are less than one robust standard 
error from the corresponding robust regression coefficients). 
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similar to prior research (e.g., DeSarbo et al. 2005; Van der Sted, Chow, and Lin 2006) I 
use MANOVA and find no statistical differences in either the Internet or mail-based 
samples between early and late respondents in the main variables of interest (i.e., 
strategy, culture, and climate constructs), thus suggesting that non-response bias is less 
of a concern.   
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CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Survey demographics 
Table 2 presents the survey demographic statistics. The Internet sample shows 
broad representation among participant, firm, and industry level demographics. Table 2, 
panel A, indicates that men and women are equally represented and a variety of 
company tenure, positions and departments are evident. Approximately 60 percent of 
companies are privately owned and both large and small companies are represented in 
the sample. Analyzers represent the most frequent business strategy employed by 
companies, followed by similar percentages of Prospectors and Defenders while 
Reactors represent the least frequent strategy.  As shown in Table 2, panel B, a wide 
array of industries is represented which are evenly distributed across business strategies.  
Unlike the Internet survey, the mail survey is not broadly representative for 
several reasons. First, because firms are randomly selected from a population of public 
companies, companies in the mail survey sample tend to be much larger. Second, 
because surveys are mailed directly to department heads, the sample is biased toward 
executive level participants (54 percent), which may explain why these participants tend 
to be male, older, and have longer company tenure.  Table 2, panel B shows 
concentrated industry segmentation where manufacturing represents the largest industry 
(59 percent), consistent with Bentley et al. 2012. 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive statistics. 
   
Panel A: Survey demographics 
Participant-level  Internet 
(N=597) 
Mail (N=78) Firm-level Internet 
(N=597) 
Mail 
(N=78) 
 Gender:   Ownership:   
Male 49% 79% Public 39% 100% 
Female 51% 21% Private 61% 0% 
      Citizenship:   Voluntary disclosure: 
US 97% 99% Yes 37% N/A 
Non-US 3% 1% No 63% N/A 
      Age:   Employees:* 
<30 16% 3% <100 26% 6% 
30-39 34% 15% 100-499 17% 19% 
40-49 26% 34% 500-999 8% 13% 
50-59 19% 36% 1,000-9,999 20% 36% 
>59 5% 12% >10,000 29% 26% 
      Education:   Annual Revenue:* 
High school degree 1% 0% <$1 million 7% 0% 
Undergraduate degree 52% 58% $1 million-$99 million 35% 19% 
Master degree 46% 38% $100 million-$499 million 9% 22% 
Doctorate degree 1% 4% $500 million-$999 million 9% 18% 
   $1 billion-$9 billion 19% 35% 
Company tenure: >$10 billion 21% 6% 
<1 year 10% 5%    
1-2 years 18% 10% Code of Ethics:   
3-4 years 17% 16% Yes 73% 96% 
5-9 years 26% 27% No 19% 3% 
>9 years 29% 42% Unsure 8% 1% 
      Company position: Strategy:   
Staff  24% 4% Reactor 12% 14% 
Manager 55% 42% Prospector 21% 24% 
Executive 21% 54% Analyzer 38% 38% 
   Defender 29% 24% 
Department:      
Accounting 41% 44%    
Finance 20% 24%    
Management 13% 10%    
Marketing 16% 17%    
Other 10% 5%    
Note: 
*Since the mail-based survey is linked to public archival data, firm information (e.g., employees, annual revenue and 
industry classification) was obtained via the archival dataset rather than from the survey instrument. 
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TABLE 2 (Continued)      
Panel B: Industry affiliation      
Industry  
 
Reactors    
     
Prospectors 
 
Analyzers 
 
Defenders 
 
Total  
 
 Internet 
(N=72) 
Mail 
(N=11) 
 
Internet 
(N=123) 
Mail 
(N=19) 
 
Internet 
(N=227) 
Mail 
(N=29) 
 
Internet 
(N=175) 
Mail 
(N=19) 
 
Internet 
(N=597) 
Mail 
(N=78) 
Business services 11%    0% 11% 0% 8%  0% 9%  0% 10% 0% 
Construction, mining & 
agriculture 
6%    9% 4% 0% 3%  14% 5% 5% 4% 8% 
Education 7%    0% 2% 0% 2%  0% 7%  0% 4% 0% 
Finance 7%    0% 15% 0% 14%  0% 10% 0% 12%  0% 
Government 6%   0% 0% 0% 1%  0% 5% 0% 2% 0% 
Healthcare 6%   0% 2% 0% 8%  0% 6% 0% 6% 0% 
High tech 7%  9% 7% 11% 9%  4% 3% 16% 7%  9% 
Insurance 1%  0% 2% 0% 2%  0% 1%  0% 2%  0% 
Manufacturing 12%  55% 22% 68% 18% 66% 15% 42% 18%  59% 
Media and entertainment 1%  0% 1% 5% 4%  3% 2% 0% 2%  3% 
Nonprofit 4%  0% 1% 0% 2%  0% 6% 0% 3%  0% 
Pharmaceuticals & 
biotechnology 
0%  0% 2% 0% 2% 0% 1% 11% 1%  3% 
Real estate 3%  0% 3% 0% 3% 0% 4% 0% 3%  0% 
Transportation, communications 
& utilities 
3%  9% 2% 0% 3%  7% 3% 5% 3% 5% 
Wholesale & retail 7%  18% 5% 16% 1%  3% 6% 16% 4% 11% 
Other 19%  0% 21% 0% 20%  3% 17% 5% 19% 2% 
Total 100%  100% 100% 100% 100%  100%% 100% 100% 100%  100%  
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Factor analysis of ethical climate and culture 
Following prior ethical climate and culture research, I use exploratory factor 
analysis to determine the dimensionality of the ethical climate and culture constructs. I 
use the principle-axis factor method with a Varimax rotation separately on my climate 
and culture items (where some items are transformed to adjust for skewness). I eliminate 
items with factor loadings less than 0.50 and/or cross-loadings more than 0.40, 
consistent with decision criteria used by Victor and Cullen (1987, 1988) and Treviño et 
al. 1998. Factor loadings show reasonable reliability because all Cronbach alpha 
measures exceed 0.70 (Nunnally 1978).  I test and find acceptable model fit of the data 
using confirmatory factor analysis.
30
 Appendix C presents the factor loadings (for the 
Internet sample only) and a description of the individual survey items contained in each 
factor.  
My ethical climate factor results closely resemble commonly derived factors 
based on the empirical literature; however, I derive four instead of five ethical climate 
dimensions (out of the nine potential theoretical dimensions). Note that prior research 
never empirically derives all nine theoretical dimensions (see Martin and Cullen‘s 2006 
meta-analysis). Figure 2 presents a schematic of the nine theoretical dimensions (panel 
A), five commonly derived dimensions (panel B), and my four derived ethical climate 
dimensions (panel C). My first factor captures an egoism-based climate (EGOISM) 
                                                 
30
 Model fit measures for the ethical climate (culture) construct using the Internet survey sample include: 
CFI=0.917 (0.947); TLI= 0.907 (0.933); SRMR=0.058 (0.052); RMSEA=0.060 (0.069). The data show 
reasonable model fit since the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and Tucker Lewis Index (TLI) values are 
above 0.90; the standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) values are below 0.08 and root mean 
square error of approximation (RMSEA) are approximately at 0.06. Refer to Brown 2006 for a summary 
of model fit guidelines.  
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focused on maximizing the individual‘s or company‘s welfare; my second and third 
factor capture different types of benevolent-based climates where one climate is focused 
internally on employee welfare (BENV-CARING) and the other climate is focused 
externally on being socially responsible to the customer and community (BENV-
SOCIAL); my fourth factor captures a principle-based climate (PRINCIPLE) focused on 
strict adherence to company rules/procedures and external laws.  
Next I use factor analysis to derive the number of ethical culture dimensions. 
Using my full Internet sample, I derive two empirical dimensions of ethical culture: the 
overall tone of the ethical environment (ENVIRONMENT) and how strongly the 
organization requires strict obedience to authority figures (OBEDIENCE).
 
There is a 
third dimension of culture, ethics code implementation (IMPLEMENT), which is only 
applicable to organizations which have a written code of ethics.
 31,32
  
                                                 
31
 Public companies are required to have a written code of ethics (or explain why they do not have one) 
under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Thus whether companies have a written code of ethics provides 
more of an indication of a firm‘s statutory compliance rather than offering significant insights into their 
ethical culture. Because my archival-linked subsample is constructed of only public companies, I derive 
this third cultural component (IMPLEMENT) for all observations in this sample (except for three 
observations which are excluded from the analysis). However, because my Internet sample consists of 
non-public companies, I find that over 25 percent of organizations in the Internet sample do not have a 
written code of ethics.  Because I find no statistical differences (mean and median tests) between ethical 
culture factor scores applicable to all organizations (ENVIRONMENT; OBEDIENCE) constructed on 
separate code and non-code subsamples, I determine that it is appropriate to pool code and non-code 
organizations in the analysis.  I construct an indicator variable for whether the organization has a code of 
ethics (CODE) and use this as a control variable in subsequent analyses.  
 
32
 I perform separate MANOVA procedures to compare (1) the two Internet-based survey populations 
(IMA and alumni center), (2) Internet survey participants who voluntarily disclosed the name of their 
organization and those who did not disclose, and (3) mail-based surveys and Internet sample with 
voluntary disclosures that can be linked to the archival dataset.  I find no significant differences (p<0.05) 
among the main constructs of interest (i.e., strategy, climate, and culture factor constructs), suggesting that 
it is appropriate to pool these various groups of observations. 
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Figure 2. Ethical climate illustration. 
 
Panel A: Victor and Cullen‘s (1987, 1988) theoretical ethical climates. 
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Panel B: Common empirical derivations of ethical climates. 
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Panel C: Empirical derivations of ethical climates based on current study. 
 
 
 Locus of Analysis 
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BENV-CARING 
BENV-SOCIAL 
 
Principle 
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Note: 
Figures in panels A and B are reproduced from Martin and Cullen 2006. 
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Pearson correlations 
In Table 3, I present Pearson correlations for both the useable Internet survey 
sample and the combined mail/voluntarily disclosed archival-linked survey sample with 
populations of n=512 and 124, respectively. Overall, I find that the correlations among 
ethical culture and climate attributes are consistent with both prior theoretical and 
empirical research where an egoism climate is the only climate associated with negative 
ethical cultural attributes and the benevolence and principle climates are associated with 
positive cultural attributes. For example, EGOISM is the only climate negatively 
correlated with an ethical cultural environment (ENVIRONMENT) while the remaining 
climates (BENV-CARING, BENV-SOCIAL, and PRINCIPLE) are positively correlated 
with ENVIRONMENT. In addition, firms with a PRINCIPLE climate are positively 
correlated with having a code of ethics (CODE) and stronger ethics code implementation 
(IMPLEMENTATION). Reactors are positively correlated with an egoism climate and 
negatively correlated with benevolent- and principle-based climates, consistent with 
theoretical expectations. However, contrary to expectations, Prospectors are negatively 
correlated with an egoism climate and rather are positively correlated with benevolent 
climates. Defenders and Analyzers do not overall show a strong positive correlation to 
any particular climate. Because organizational theory predicts that culture mediates the 
relationship between business strategy and ethical climate, I do not place strong 
emphasis on the direct correlation between strategy and climate without controlling for 
organizational culture in the model.  
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TABLE 3 
Pearson correlations. Internet-based sample represented above diagonal (n=512) / archival-linked sample (i.e., mail and applicable Internet) represented below diagonal 
(n=124). 
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REACTOR 1 -0.19 -0.29 -0.23 0.19 -0.18 -0.03 -0.12 -0.20 0.15 -0.08 -0.25 -0.21 -0.25 
PROSPECTOR -0.20 1 -0.41 -0.32 -0.08 0.13 0.18 0.08 0.21 -0.16 0.10 0.13 0.17 0.23 
ANALYZER -0.34 -0.46 1 -0.50 -0.06 0.07 -0.11 0.07 -0.01 -0.05 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.00 
DEFENDER -0.20 -0.28 -0.46 1 0.00 -0.07 -0.03 -0.06 -0.04 0.09 -0.08 0.04 -0.01 -0.03 
EGOISM 0.34 -0.27 -0.12 0.13 1 -0.06 -0.06 -0.01 -0.35 0.51 -0.04 -0.36 -0.39 -0.44 
BENV-CARING -0.29 0.26 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 1 0.07 0.03 0.43 -0.13 -0.04 0.44 0.50 0.48 
BENV-SOCIAL -0.14 0.20 -0.03 -0.05 -0.07 0.10 1 0.06 0.34 -0.10 0.11 0.26 0.25 0.33 
PRINCIPLE -0.13 -0.04 0.24 -0.15 -0.03 0.04 0.06 1 0.51 0.12 0.31 0.21 0.21 0.32 
ENVIRONMENT -0.45 0.29 0.18 -0.14 -0.49 0.42 0.19 0.41 1 -0.07 0.19 0.58 0.61 0.69 
OBEDIENCE 0.11 -0.05 -0.11 -0.10 0.46 0.09 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 1 -0.04 -0.31 -0.30 -0.29 
IMPLEMENT/ 
CODE* 
-0.08 0.06 -0.05 0.08 -0.08  -0.03 0.27 0.32 0.09 0.00 1 0.05 0.05 0.11 
JOB SATISFY -0.41 0.20 0.14 -0.04 -0.30 0.45 0.17 0.31 0.69 -0.23 0.13 1 0.78 0.76 
COMMIT 1 -0.45 0.28 0.07 -0.01 -0.44 0.40 0.20 0.22 0.67 -0.24 0.14 0.81 1 0.73 
COMMIT 2 -0.40 0.25 0.11 -0.05 -0.45 0.40 0.26 0.32 0.69 -0.32 0.14 0.77 0.78 1 
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Multivariate Results 
Hypothesis 1 - relationships among business strategy, ethical culture and climate  
To test my first hypothesis, I use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and 
regress each of the climate factor scores (EGOISM, BENV-CARING, BENV-SOCIAL, 
and PRINCIPLE) on the strategy indicator variables (REACTOR, PROSPECTOR, and 
DEFENDER), while controlling for the culture factor scores (ENVIRONMENT, 
OBEDIENCE). All results are interpreted relative to Analyzers. I use the Internet sample 
(n=512) as the primary sample to test this relationship in order to increase the 
generalizability of the results.  Because I pool code and non-code organizations, I also 
control for whether the organization has a written code of ethics (CODE). I control for 
participant and firm level variables in the models and cluster observations by industry. 
Refer to Appendix A for a description of each of these controls.
33
  In Table 4, each of the 
four columns reports the results estimating the model when the EGOISM, BENV-
CARING, BENV-SOCIAL, and PRINCIPLE climate factor scores serve as the dependent 
variable, respectively.  
  
  
                                                 
33
 Although I collect two size-related firm measures from the surveys (approximate number of employees 
(EMPLOYEES) and firm‘s annual revenue (REVENUE)), I rely on the EMPLOYEES measure because 
there are enough missing observations for the REVENUE measure to impose a selection bias in the results 
(as determined from a MANOVA analysis on the survey demographics). Further, the two measures are 
very highly correlated (0.87, p<0.001) and thus appear to capture the same size construct. Note that 
REVENUE was the only survey measure I allowed to be missing. 
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TABLE 4 
OLS analysis: Regressing ethical climate dimensions on business strategy, controlling for ethical culture  
(Hypothesis 1). Full Internet sample.  
 
Dependent Variables:  
(Ethical climate dimensions) 
EGOISM BENV-
CARING 
BENV-
SOCIAL 
PRINCIPLE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 INTERCEPT -0.37 0.91** 0.25 -0.48 
  (-1.12) (2.49) (0.66) (-1.42) 
Business strategy: REACTOR 0.20** -0.36*** 0.18 -0.07 
  (1.73) (-2.95) (1.42) (-0.59) 
 PROSPECTOR 0.16** 0.00 0.31*** -0.08 
  (1.75) (0.01) (3.05) (-0.84) 
 DEFENDER 0.00 -0.29*** 0.06 -0.00 
  (0.05) (-3.10) (0.65) (-0.02) 
Ethical culture: ENVIRONMENT -0.29*** 0.38*** 0.30*** 0.49*** 
  (-7.98) (9.38) (7.09) (12.92) 
 OBEDIENCE 0.52*** -0.11** -0.12*** 0.20*** 
  (12.97) (-2.47) (-2.64) (4.84) 
Firm-level  CODE -0.03 -0.09 0.07 0.27*** 
controls:  (-0.36) (-0.93) (0.75) (3.08) 
 EMPLOYEES 0.04 -0.10*** 0.02 0.09*** 
  (1.56) (-3.44) (0.69) (3.31) 
 PUBLIC 0.08 -0.11 -0.11 0.06 
  (0.94) (-1.19) (-1.16) (0.74) 
Participant-level 
controls 
 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  512 512 512 512 
Adjusted R-squared  0.37 0.29 0.16 0.38 
Notes:  
Coefficient values (t-statistics) are shown.***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively two-tailed (one-tailed if predicted). The dependent variables represent different ethical climate 
dimensions based on factor scores (see Appendix C for factor loadings). Industry fixed effects are based on 
the industry categories shown in Table 2, panel B. Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions.  
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I focus my discussion on the results related to Prospector firms in light of 
Bentley et al. 2012‘s finding that Prospector firms continually experience financial 
irregularities despite the increase in auditor efforts related to this business strategy. The 
coefficient on PROSPECTOR is positive and significant (p=0.04, one-tailed (henceforth 
all p-values for predicted OLS coefficients are reported one-tailed)) in the EGOISM 
model where EGOISM is the only type of climate also associated with a less ethical 
cultural environment as shown by the negative and significant (p<0.01) ENVIRONMENT 
coefficient (see Table 4, column 1). Thus, as predicted, Prospector firms appear to be 
associated with an individualist, egoism-based ethical climate –i.e., a climate 
characterized by a less ethical environment. However, the coefficient on PROSPECTOR 
is also positive and significant (p<0.01) in the BENV-SOCIAL model where BENV-
SOCIAL is a climate associated with a more ethical cultural environment as shown by 
the positive and significant (p<0.01) ENVIRONMENT coefficient (see Table 4, column 
3). Thus, Prospector firms also appear to be associated with a benevolence climate 
focused on being socially responsible, which is a climate characterized by an ethical 
environment. 
Because of these contradictory results I investigate whether the results relate to 
different sets of Prospector firms. Untabulated results reveal that a smaller (larger) set of 
Prospector firms have EGOISM factor scores above (below) the median and also have 
BENV-SOCIAL factor scores that are below (above) the median. Therefore, these results 
suggest that there are two separate groups of Prospector firms with the smaller set being 
associated with an egoism ethical climate. Untabulated mean and median tests reveal 
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that the set of Prospectors with higher EGOISM factor scores relative to Prospectors with 
higher BENV-SOCIAL factor scores have less ethical environments, impose greater 
obedience to authority figures, and have lower levels of job satisfaction  and 
organizational commitment. I find no statistically significant differences based on firm 
level attributes (e.g., firm size and whether the company was publicly traded) between 
the two sets of Prospectors.
34
 Because prior empirical research has consistently shown 
that unethical behavior—e .g., lying, cheating and falsifying reports—arises in 
organizations with an egoism climate and in organizations with lower levels of job 
satisfaction and organizational commitment, one can infer from these results that the 
smaller set of Prospector firms associated with an less ethical cultural environment and 
egoistic climate may then be more prone to financial misreporting.  
Next I briefly discuss the OLS results of the remaining strategy classifications in 
Table 4.  Overall, I find that Reactor firms are associated with an egoism ethical climate, 
consistent with Joyce and Slocum‘s 1990 theoretical expectations. Specifically, I find 
that the coefficient on REACTOR is positive and significant in the EGOISM model 
(p=0.04), similar to Prospector firms. Furthermore, the strong association that Reactors 
have with the egoism climate may give insight into why the organizational literature 
predicts that the Reactor strategy is considered non-viable in the long-term.  
Finally, I examine the OLS results related to the Defender strategy. Contrary to 
expectations that Defenders have a rule-oriented, principle-based climate, the coefficient 
                                                 
34
 There is a third set of Prospectors that have both EGOISM and BENV-SOCIAL factor scores above the 
median. These observations are excluded from this sub-analysis in order to isolate only those Prospector 
firms that are exclusively ―egoistic‖ or ―benevolent‖. 
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on DEFENDER is not statistically significant in the PRINCIPLE climate model (column 
4). The insignificant association between Defenders and a principle-based climate may 
be due to a lack of variation in responses among participants regarding these types of 
questions, as responses to survey questions related to this climate are heavily skewed 
(relative to responses in the other climate dimensions). Furthermore, none of the 
business strategies show a significant association with a principle-based climate. The 
DEFENDER coefficient is negative and statistically significant (p<0.01) in the BENV-
CARING model as shown in column 2, suggesting that relative to the Analyzer strategy, 
Defenders are less likely to have a benevolence climate. This finding is consistent with 
expectations that Analyzers due to their moderate tendencies may be more likely to 
exhibit a benevolence climate. Because the DEFENDER coefficient is not positive and 
significant in any of the climate models, climate differences between Defenders and 
Analyzers appear to be otherwise indistinguishable. This result may partially explain 
why Bentley et al. (2012) find that neither Defenders nor Analyzers are likely to 
experience financial reporting irregularities.  
The results in Table 4 provide evidence that substantiates predicted relationships 
between business strategies and ethical climates (while controlling for ethical culture), 
supporting my first hypothesis. Next I test whether ethical culture mediates the 
relationship between business strategy and ethical climate, as posited by prior research. I 
test for mediation results using two approaches. In the first approach, I employ a 
bootstrapping-based method advocated by recent research (e.g., Preacher and Hayes 
2008; Hayes 2009) as a more powerful and statistically valid way to test for mediation 
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over the traditional Baron and Kenny (1986) approach. In the second approach I use 
simultaneous equation modeling (SEM) to perform the mediation analysis.
35
  
Untabulated results from the bootstrapping approach reveal that culture mediates 
the effect of business strategy on ethical climate. The relative mediation effects are 
statistically significant using a 95 percent bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval 
based on a 5,000 bootstrap sample for both Prospector and Reactor firms in all ethical 
climates. However, the relative mediation effects are not statistically significant for 
Defender firms, suggesting that differences between Defenders and Analyzers are not 
statistically distinct.  I find that ethical ENVIRONMENT negatively mediates the 
relationship between Prospector firms and an egoism climate while ethical 
ENVIRONMENT positively mediates the relationship between Prospector firms and all 
other ethical climates (BENV-CARING, BENV-SOCIAL, and PRINCIPLE). Using SEM, 
I confirm that that ethical culture partially mediates the relation between business 
strategy and ethical climate; thus, a negative ethical ENVIRONMENT results in an 
EGOISM climate while a positive ethical ENVIRONMENT results in any of the 
remaining ethical climates. In addition, I find that Prospector firms continue to be 
positively associated with an EGOISM and BENV-SOCIAL ethical climate, confirming 
the OLS results.  
Overall, my results reveal that ethical culture significantly mediates the 
relationship between business strategy and ethical climate, supporting Hypothesis 1.  I 
find that a set of Prospector firms perpetuates a less ethical organizational culture and 
                                                 
35
 I obtain adequate model fit using SEM analysis where CFI=0.91, TLI=0.90, SRMR=0.07 and 
RMSEA=0.05. Refer to footnote 30 for a description of model fit benchmarks. 
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climate providing additional insight into why Prospectors demonstrate aggressive 
reporting behavior. In addition, my findings also provide insight into why Bentley et al. 
2012 find that Prospector firms, on average, continue to experience financial 
irregularities despite the increased audit effort directed at these firms. Specifically, 
auditors may be unable to distinguish between ―good‖ and ―bad‖ Prospectors. If this is 
true, then the increase in auditors‘ efforts toward Prospector clients observed by Bentley 
et al. 2012 may be directed too generally across all Prospectors rather than being 
targeted more directly at the smaller set of less ethical Prospectors that are likely more 
prone to financial misreporting. The relatively small set of less ethical Prospectors 
appear to have low levels of employee job satisfaction and organizational commitment 
and thus auditors may need to pay particular attention to these Prospector clients.  
Ultimately, the financial irregularities observed by Bentley et al. 2012 may be 
attributable primarily to the set of less ethical Prospector firms.  
Hypothesis 2 - linking business strategy, ethical culture and climate to the risk of 
financial misreporting  
Hypothesis 2 examines the complete theoretical framework as shown in Figure 1 
by analyzing whether ethical culture and ethical climate (a proxy for 
attitudes/rationalizations) mediate the relationship between business strategy and the 
risk of material financial misstatement, while controlling for relevant opportunity and 
incentive factors. To test Hypothesis 2, I utilize the survey sample that can be linked to 
the external AGR measure of misreporting risk (i.e., combined mail surveys/applicable 
voluntarily disclosed Internet surveys) for a total of 124 survey observations. I match the 
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survey data (business strategy, ethical culture and climate) with the AGR external 
measure of reporting risk and with archival incentive and opportunity risk factor 
measures. I include controls for the survey participant‘s level of job satisfaction and 
organizational commitment because these measures typically mediate the relationship 
between ethical climate and organizational behavior (see Martin and Cullen 2006).
36
  
To increase statistical power, I employ a pooled regression model where I merge 
the 124 survey data observations with several years of recent, non-missing archival data 
(i.e., fiscal years 2008-2011). To prevent firms with earlier reporting periods from 
incrementally influencing the results (i.e., firms with non-December year end fiscal dates 
could have four firm-years of archival information between fiscal years 2008-2011), I 
only retain the three most recent firm-year observations for a total of 296 
observations.
37,38
 I double-cluster standard errors by firm and industry and employ year 
fixed effects.  Table 5 presents the OLS results. I regress the AGR risk measure on 
ethical climate (my proxy for the third leg of the fraud triangle, 
attitudes/rationalizations), business strategies, and ethical culture, while controlling for 
opportunity/incentive factors and participant-level controls. 
                                                 
36
 The job satisfaction and organizational commitment measures are highly correlated and demonstrate 
multicollinearity in my regression models. Thus I use Principle Components Analysis (PCA) to reduce the 
dimensionality and find that all three measures load highly on one factor (i.e., loadings above 0.90).  
 
37
 Because both organizational strategy and culture are long-term and generally consistent in nature (e.g., 
Snow and Hambrick 1980; Schwartz and Davis 1981), matching these constructs with several years of 
recent archival firm data appears reasonable.  However, in sensitivity tests I restrict my model to the most 
recent archival firm data to align with survey measures in the same year (refer to Chapter 6).  
 
38
 I follow Bentley et al. (2012) and only winsorize book-to-market (BTM) and discretionary accruals 
(DAP) at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles in my tabulated results. However, inferences in the OLS model remain 
the same when winsorizing all continuous archival control variables. 
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TABLE 5 
OLS analysis: Regressing the risk of financial misstatement (AGR) on ethical climate, business strategy, and ethical 
culture, controlling for opportunity and incentive factors (Hypothesis 2). Archival-linked sample. 
 
Dependent Variable:  Predicted Sign AGR 
 INTERCEPT ? 49.98*** 
   (2.65) 
Ethical climate: EGOISM + 3.94* 
   (1.56) 
 BENV-CARING - -11.68*** 
   (-5.53) 
 BENV-SOCIAL - 3.26 
   (2.21) 
 PRINCIPLE - -2.72* 
   (-1.38) 
Business strategy: REACTOR + -2.69 
   (-0.51) 
 PROSPECTOR + 7.30** 
   (1.77) 
 DEFENDER - 5.11 
   (0.98) 
Ethical culture: ENVIRONMENT - 8.41 
   (4.40) 
 OBEDIENCE ? -2.43* 
   (-1.86) 
 IMPLEMENT - -2.94 
   (-1.28) 
Opportunity & Incentive 
controls: 
ln(ASSETS) ? 5.14*** 
  (7.35) 
 ROA - 11.79 
   (0.71) 
 LOSS + 0.30 
   (0.09) 
 BTM - -7.50*** 
   (-2.90) 
 SALES GROWTH ? -0.16* 
   (-1.86) 
 M&A + -6.29 
   (-1.81) 
 LEVERAGE ? 27.08*** 
   (3.69) 
 FINANCING + -11.43 
   (-1.03) 
 HERF + -14.96 
   (-1.24) 
 LITIGIOUS + 2.09 
   (0.33) 
 DAP ? -12.65 
   (-0.48) 
 BIGN - -24.21*** 
   (-3.25) 
 DED IO ? 6.29 
   (0.26) 
Participant-level controls  Yes 
Year fixed effects   Yes 
Observations   296 
Adjusted R-squared   0.27 
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TABLE 5 (Continued) 
 
Notes:  
Coefficient values (t-statistics) are shown with standard errors clustered by firm and industry (industry groups as 
defined in Fama and French 1988). ***, **, *  indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively, two-tailed (one-tailed if predicted). The dependent variable is an Accounting and Governance 
(AGR) risk measure produced by Audit Integrity which is measured discretely from 0 to 100 (where higher 
values indicate an increased risk in misreporting). Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions.  
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Altogether, the results provide some evidence that ethical climate, serving as a 
proxy for attitudes/rationalizations, is significantly associated with the risk of financial 
misstatement. Specifically, Table 5 shows that the coefficient on EGOISM is positive 
and marginally significant (p=0.06), indicating that firms with egoism climates are 
associated with greater risks of misreporting. In addition, the coefficients on BENV-
CARING and PRINCIPLE are negative and significant (p=0.02 and p=0.09, 
respectively), indicating that benevolence and principle ethical climates are negatively 
associated with the risk of misreporting. However, the positive coefficient sign on the 
second type of benevolence climate (BENV-SOCIAL) which is inconsistent with 
expectations is insignificant (i.e., t-stat of 2.21 is insignificant based on one-tailed test 
with opposite sign prediction).
39
 
Consistent with Bentley et al. 2011, I find that Prospector firms are positively 
associated with the risk of misreporting indicated by the positive and statistically 
significant PROSPECTOR coefficient (p=0.04) in Table 5, even while controlling for 
ethical culture and climate in the model. Thus this finding suggests that culture and 
climate do not fully mediate the relationship between business strategy and the risk of 
financial misstatement. Untabulated bootstrapping mediation results reveal that only the 
BENV-CARING climate serves as a significant mediator for Prospector firms and both 
                                                 
39
 In sensitivity tests, I find a very small (large) number of Prospectors have high EGOISM (BENV-
SOCIAL) factor scores in the archival-linked subsample, thus suggesting a potential selection bias with 
this subsample relative to the Internet sample. Therefore, the reason for an opposite coefficient sign on 
BENV-SOCIAL as well as on ENVIRONMENT is likely due to the strong correlation that these attributes 
have with the larger group of more ethical Prospectors, which are more numerous in this subsample.  
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the EGOISM and BENV-CARING climates serve as significant mediators between 
Reactor firms and the risk of AGR.
40
 
Overall, my results provide some evidence supporting Hypothesis 2 that the 
relationship between business strategies and the risk of financial misreporting is 
mediated by ethical climate (a proxy for fraud attitudes/rationalizations). Specifically I 
find evidence that firms with an egoism-based climate are associated with a greater risk 
of financial misreporting while firms with a principle-based climate and a benevolence 
climate focused internally on promoting employee welfare are associated with a reduced 
risk of financial misreporting, consistent with theoretical expectations. Altogether, my 
results provide some evidence that ethical climate may serve as a proxy for the 
rationalization portion of the fraud triangle, thereby providing incremental information 
beyond both the incentive and opportunity to misreport. These tests and results address 
Hogan et al.‘s (2008) call for more research in this area.
                                                 
40
 I cannot test for mediation using SEM because there are not enough degrees of freedom with the number 
of parameters required for this smaller subsample. 
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CHAPTER VI 
ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 
 
Time Period Alignment 
 In sensitivity tests I restrict my model to the most recent archival firm data (e.g., 
fiscal year 2010 or 2011) in order to better align survey measures with data in the same 
reporting year. I note that the overall statistical power is low (making the results 
somewhat unreliable) and thus, as expected many of my coefficients of interest become 
insignificant as shown in Table 6.
41
  However, even in this model, some of the ethical 
climate variables, namely EGOISM and BENV-CARING, maintain significance. In fact, 
the coefficient on EGOISM is now significant at the p<0.05 level. Therefore, these 
results confirm that firms with a less ethical climate (EGOISM) are associated with a 
greater risk of misreporting while firms with a more ethical climate (BENV-CARING) 
are associated with a reduced risk of misreporting. 
                                                 
41
 The control for dedicated institutional investors (DED IO) is omitted due to too many missing 
observations. 
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TABLE 6 
Sensitivity analysis: Restricting the archival-linked sample to the most recent fiscal year observations. 
 
Dependent Variable:  Predicted Sign AGR 
 INTERCEPT ? 12.98 
   (0.46) 
Ethical climate: EGOISM + 7.41** 
   (2.03) 
 BENV-CARING - -13.67*** 
   (-5.61) 
 BENV-SOCIAL - 1.93 
   (0.54) 
 PRINCIPLE - -1.56 
   (-0.54) 
Business strategy: REACTOR + -13.96 
   (-1.69) 
 PROSPECTOR + 4.79 
   (0.73) 
 DEFENDER - 5.78 
   (0.08) 
Ethical culture: ENVIRONMENT - 6.62 
   (2.27) 
 OBEDIENCE ? -2.98 
   (-0.81) 
 IMPLEMENT - 1.82 
   (0.46) 
Opportunity & Incentive 
controls: 
ln(ASSETS) ? 4.34*** 
  (4.03) 
 ROA - 67.04 
   (2.41) 
 LOSS + -1.80 
   (-0.24) 
 BTM - -6.67* 
   (-1.38) 
 SALES GROWTH ? -0.05 
   (-0.65) 
 M&A + -6.78 
   (-0.96) 
 LEVERAGE ? 28.18** 
   (2.19) 
 FINANCING + -10.74 
   (-0.92) 
 HERF + -30.55 
   (-1.69) 
 LITIGIOUS + 7.96** 
   (2.01) 
 DAP ? -76.53*** 
   (-3.17) 
 BIGN - -15.79 
   (-1.03) 
 DED IO ? Omitted 
Participant-level controls  Yes 
Observations   101 
Adjusted R-squared   0.15 
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TABLE 6 (Continued) 
 
Notes:  
Coefficient values (t-statistics) are shown with standard errors clustered by firm and industry (industry groups as 
defined in Fama and French 1988). ***, **, *  indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively, two-tailed (one-tailed if predicted). The dependent variable is an Accounting and Governance 
(AGR) risk measure produced by Audit Integrity which is measured discretely from 0 to 100 (where higher 
values indicate an increased risk in misreporting). Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions.  
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Additional Archival Controls 
As described in the model development section (Chapter 3), I follow Bentley et 
al. (2012) in identifying relevant incentive and opportunity factors to include in my 
model because Bentley et al. (2012) provide an extensive discussion linking business 
strategies to these relevant factors. In this section, I expand my selection of incentive and 
opportunity factors to include firm age and material weaknesses, respectively, which 
have been linked to lower accounting quality (e.g., Beneish 1997; Doyle, Ge, and 
McVay 2007a, b). Although Bentley et al. (2012) control for firm age in their main 
model (computed as the length of time from the company‘s initial public offering (IPO) 
using CRSP), this computation results in a significant loss of observations when aligned 
with my survey data. Thus, I substitute this measure with the number of years the firm 
has total assets reported in Compustat (FIRM AGE) (e.g., Myers, Myers, and Omer 
2003).  As shown in Table 7, column one, results are robust to controlling for firm age in 
the model and the coefficient on FIRM AGE is not significant. In addition, I control for 
whether a firm has either a material weakness in their internal controls attributed to 
Section 302 and/or 404 under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) following Bentley et al.‘s 
(2012) sensitivity analysis. Results are robust to controlling for material weaknesses in 
the model as shown in Table 7, column two. 
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TABLE 7 
Sensitivity analysis: Controlling for firm age and material weaknesses in the archival-linked sample. 
 
Dependent Variable:  Predicted Sign AGR 
   (1) (2) 
 INTERCEPT ? 49.29** 52.19*** 
   (2.65) (2.86) 
Ethical climate: EGOISM + 3.97* 4.06* 
   (1.59) (1.31) 
 BENV-CARING - -11.57*** -11.25*** 
   (-5.57) (-4.64) 
 BENV-SOCIAL - 3.15 3.46 
   (2.02) (1.91) 
 PRINCIPLE - -2.768* -3.07* 
   (-1.35) (-1.54) 
Business strategy: REACTOR + -2.98 -1.32 
   (-0.59) (-0.21) 
 PROSPECTOR + 7.56** 6.75** 
   (1.90) (1.93) 
 DEFENDER - 4.85 5.72 
   (0.92) (1.22) 
Ethical culture: ENVIRONMENT - 8.23 8.36 
   (4.16) (5.01) 
 OBEDIENCE ? -2.54** -2.95** 
   (-2.02) (-2.16) 
 IMPLEMENT - -3.00* -2.28 
   (-1.32) (-1.03) 
Opportunity & Incentive 
controls: 
ln(ASSETS) ? 5.50*** 5.07*** 
  (6.59) (6.45) 
 ROA - 11.87 10.04 
   (0.73) (0.54) 
 LOSS + -0.00 -0.50 
   (-0.00) (-0.15) 
 BTM - -7.54*** -8.18*** 
   (-2.76) (-2.59) 
 SALES GROWTH ? -0.16** -0.17** 
   (-1.86) (-2.36) 
 M&A + -6.88 -6.85 
   (-2.05) (-1.78) 
 LEVERAGE ? 26.55*** 27.88*** 
   (3.37) (3.81) 
 FINANCING + -11.88 -10.89 
   (-1.09) (-1.02) 
 HERF + -12.63 -16.81 
   (-1.06) (-1.38) 
 LITIGIOUS + 2.24 1.86 
   (0.35) (0.28) 
 DAP ? -12.01 -9.87 
   (-0.46) (-0.33) 
 BIGN - -25.11*** -22.37*** 
   (-3.43) (-2.89) 
 DED IO ? 4.75 1.00 
   (0.20) (0.04) 
 FIRM AGE ? -0.07  
   (-0.93)  
 MW +  11.06 
    (0.78) 
 
  
 
61 
TABLE 7 (Continued) 
 
Participant-level controls  Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects   Yes Yes 
Observations   296 274 
Adjusted R-squared   0.27 0.25 
 
Notes:  
Coefficient values (t-statistics) are shown with standard errors clustered by firm and industry groups as defined in 
Fama and French 1988). ***, **, *  indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively, two-tailed (one-tailed if predicted). The dependent variable is an Accounting and Governance 
(AGR) risk measure produced by Audit Integrity which is measured discretely from 0 to 100 (where higher 
values indicate an increased risk in misreporting). FIRM AGE is measured as the number of years that the 
company has total assets reported in Compustat. MW is measured as an indicator variable equal to one if the 
firm experienced a material weakness under SOX 302 and/or 404, and zero otherwise (from Audit 
Analytics). Refer to Appendix A for the remaining variable definitions.  
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Validation Tests 
For my final analysis, I test the validity of Bentley et al.‘s 2012 archival measure 
of business strategy by replicating this measure over the most current time period and 
comparing it to the survey responses. Using Miles and Snow‘s (1978, 2003) business 
strategy typology, Bentley et al. (2012) develop a discrete STRATEGY measure, 
constructed entirely from publicly available data which capture different attributes of the 
firm (e.g., historical growth patterns, marketing and R&D activities). Firms with higher 
STRATEGY scores represent Prospector-type firms (e.g., greater levels of growth, 
marketing and R&D activities relative to industry competitors) while firms with lower 
STRATEGY scores represent Defender-type firms (e.g., lower levels of growth, 
marketing and R&D activities relative to industry competitors). Firms with mid-level 
scores are classified as hybrid Analyzer-type firms. Reactor-firms are not categorized 
since organizational theory predicts that these firms are generally not viable in the long-
term and are difficult to identify (e.g., Miles and Snow 1978, 2003). 
I examine the correlations between the archival STRATEGY measure and strategy 
classifications based on my survey responses.  I partition my sample on survey 
participants who are the most likely to correctly assess their firm‘s strategy, as suggested 
by prior strategy research: senior-level executives associated with either management or 
marketing activities.
42
 I find that STRATEGY is positive and significantly correlated 
                                                 
42
 The primary respondents targeted in prior business strategy questionnaires are CEOs or marketing 
directors, because CEOs are generally viewed as the most qualified to assess the firm‘s strategy (Conant et 
al. 1990; Golden 1997), and marketing directors ―often play an active role both in business-level and 
marketing strategy formulation‖ (Conant et al. 1990, 371) and ―should be knowledgeable about the 
importance that the business attaches to the marketing activities and thus, should be reliable informants‖ 
(Slater and Olson 2001, 1058). 
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(p=0.03) with Prospector firms and negative and significantly negatively correlated 
(p<0.01) with Defender firms. Although, STRATEGY is positively correlated with 
Analyzer firms, the correlation is positive and marginally significant (p=0.07), consistent 
with the notion that Analyzers occupy the middle of the STRATEGY measure continuum. 
Altogether, these findings support the validation of the Bentley et al. 2011 archival 
STRATEGY measure where firms on the upper (lower) end of the continuum are properly 
classified as Prospector (Defender) firms. I also find that STRATEGY is not significantly 
associated with Reactors, consistent with Bentley et al.‘s decision to only model the 
three viable strategies (Prospectors, Defenders, and Analyzers).  
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
 
This study examines whether a firm‘s organizational business strategy influences 
its ethical culture and climate, thus explaining why a firm‘s business strategy may 
ultimately contribute to an increased risk of financial misstatement. Using organizational 
theory and empirical evidence from recent research, I identify that business strategy may 
be the primary antecedent linking the third and final fraud risk factor under SAS No. 99 
(attitudes/rationalizations) through an organization‘s ethical climate to the risk of 
financial misstatement. Using a large-scale research survey, I find empirical evidence to 
support my hypothesis that firms‘ business strategies are associated with the evolution of 
ethical cultures and climates.  
My findings provide insight into why Bentley et al. (2012) find that firms 
following a Prospector business strategy continue to experience financial irregularities 
despite the increase in auditors‘ efforts. I find that firms following a Prospector business 
strategy generate different ethical cultures and climates where a relatively smaller set of 
Prospector firms develops a less ethical culture and climate (consistent with theoretical 
expectations) and a larger set of Prospector firms develops a more ethical culture and 
climate.  While auditors may be able to distinguish business strategies and their risks as 
suggested by Bentley et al. 2012, auditors may not be paying enough attention to ethical 
cultures and climates. Thus, the increase in auditors‘ efforts toward Prospector clients 
observed by Bentley et al. 2012 may be directed generally to all Prospector firms rather 
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than being focused on the set of less ethical Prospectors, which are firms at greater risk 
to commit less ethical behavior.  Comparatively, I find that the smaller set of less ethical 
Prospectors have lower levels of employee job satisfaction and organizational 
commitment, suggesting that auditors may need to pay particular attention to Prospector 
clients with these attributes. I also find that firms following a second type of strategy, a 
transitory Reactor strategy, tend to have less ethical cultures and climates, giving insight 
into why organizational theory predicts that a Reactor strategy is not generally viable in 
the long-term.  
I then combine my survey results with archival data, for a subset of public 
companies, to examine the relationship between a firm‘s business strategy, ethical 
climate and culture, and the risk of financial misreporting (controlling for incentive and 
opportunity factors). Specifically, I examine the relationship between my survey 
measures (business strategy, ethical culture and climate) and an external risk measure 
developed by Audit Integrity that captures the likelihood that financial statements 
contain false or misleading information. Using a combination of survey and archival 
data, I replicate Bentley et al.‘s (2012) results indicating that Prospector firms are 
significantly more likely to experience higher levels of financial misreporting. In 
addition, I find some evidence that firms with less (more) ethical climates are associated 
with an increased (reduced) risk of financial misreporting. Thus, ethical climate may be 
an important factor in the rationalization aspect of the fraud triangle and likely provides 
incremental information beyond the incentive and opportunity aspects. I find limited 
evidence to suggest that either organizational culture or climate directly mediates the 
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relationship between business strategy and misreporting risk. Altogether, this study 
identifies business strategy as a primary antecedent linking ethical culture and climate to 
the risk of financial misreporting, thus addressing previous calls for research (e.g., Zahra 
et al. 2005; Hogan et al. 2008) involving the fraud triangle and underlying antecedents 
for financial misreporting.  
This study makes several contributions to both the accounting and management 
literatures. First, although theory predicts an association between organizational 
strategies and ethical cultures and climates, there is little empirical research to support 
these predictions. My study provides empirical evidence linking specific strategies to 
certain ethical culture and climate dimensions. Second, using a combination of survey 
and external archival measures, I provide insight into why recent research (i.e., Higgins 
et al. 2011; Bentley et al. 2012) finds a significant association between certain business 
strategies and aggressive reporting behavior. Specifically, I find that certain business 
strategies appear to cultivate less ethical cultures and climates.  Finally, I provide some 
evidence that companies with more less ethical climates (again, my proxy for the third 
and final SAS No. 99 risk factor) are more prone to financial misreporting while 
companies with stronger ethical climates are less prone to financial misreporting. 
Altogether, my study provides empirical support for a theoretical framework identifying 
why business strategy is an underlying antecedent for financial statement misreporting. 
These findings, along with the links I document between business strategy and an 
organization‘s ethical culture and climate, provide important evidence regarding the 
third leg of the auditing fraud triangle (rationalization). 
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APPENDIX A 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
 Variable  Description 
Survey variables (primary):   
Strategy 
classifications: 
 
  REACTOR = Indicator variable equal to 1 (and 0 otherwise) if the company is 
classified as a Reactor, whose strategy focuses on responding to 
environmental conditions; 
   PROSPECTOR = Indicator variable equal to 1 (and 0 otherwise) if the company is 
classified as a Prospector, whose strategy focuses on being an 
innovative product/service leader in a wide range of markets; 
   ANALYZER = Indicator variable equal to 1 (and 0 otherwise) if the company is 
classified as a Analyzer, whose strategy  focuses on balancing 
efficiency in producing products/services while also maintaining an 
innovative product/service sector; 
   DEFENDER = Indicator variable equal to 1 (and 0 otherwise) if the company is 
classified as a Defender, whose strategy focuses on efficiently 
producing a narrow set of products/services; 
Ethical climate 
classifications: 
(also refer to 
Appendix C) 
  EGOISM = Higher factor loadings indicate an egoism-based ethical climate where 
organizational values are dominated by maximizing self-interests; 
  BENV-CARING = Higher factor loadings indicate a benevolent-based ethical climate 
where organizational values are dominated by considering the 
consequences to others in the organization (i.e., internally-focused on 
employees‘ welfare); 
   BENV-SOCIAL = Higher factor loadings indicate a benevolent-based ethical climate  
where organizational values are dominated by considering the 
consequences to customers and outside community (i.e., externally 
focused on social responsibility) ; 
   PRINCIPLE = Higher factor loadings indicate a principle-based ethical climate where 
organizational values are dominated by adherence to company policies 
and laws; 
Ethical culture 
classifications: 
(also refer to 
Appendix C) 
  ENVIRONMENT = Higher factor loadings indicate the organization has a strong ethical 
environment (e.g., unethical behavior is punished while ethical 
behavior is rewarded); 
  OBEDIENCE = Higher factor loadings indicate the organization demands obedience to 
authority figures without question; 
   IMPLEMENT = Higher factor loadings indicate the organization has strong ethical code 
implementation (applicable for companies with a written ethical code); 
Survey variables (secondary):   
 JOB SATISFY = Higher scale ratings indicate greater job satisfaction;  
 COMMIT 1 = Higher scale ratings indicate greater organization commitment related 
to the participant identifying with organizational goals and attitudes; 
 COMMIT 2 = Higher scale ratings indicate greater organization commitment related 
to the participant internalizing the organization‘s perspective; 
 JOB_COMMIT = Constructed of JOB SATISFY, COMMIT 1 and COMMIT 2 using PCA 
where higher factor loadings indicate greater job satisfaction and 
organizational commitment; 
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Appendix A (Continued)   
Survey controls (firm-level):   
 CODE = Indicator variable equal to one  if the company has a written code of 
ethics, and 0 otherwise; 
 EMPLOYEES = Ordinal variable where higher values indicate greater number of 
employees; 
 REVENUE = Ordinal variable where higher values indicate greater annual revenue; 
 PUBLIC = Indicator variable equal to one  if the firm is publicly listed, and 0 
otherwise; 
Survey controls (participant-level): 
 RELIGIOSITY = Higher scale ratings indicate greater importance religion holds to the 
individual in daily life;  
 FEMALE = Indicator variable equal to one for female, and 0 otherwise; 
 US = Indicator variable equal to one  for a United States citizen, and 0 
otherwise; 
 AGE = Ordinal variable where higher values indicate an older age;  
 EDUCATION = Ordinal variable where higher values indicate completing a higher 
level of education; 
 TENURE = Ordinal variable where higher values indicate longer employment 
tenure in the company; 
 POSITION = Ordinal variable where higher values indicate a more senior position in 
the organization; 
 DEPT = Categorical variable for employment in the accounting, finance, 
management, marketing, or other departments; 
Archival Variables: 
 AGR = Audit Integrity‘s Accounting and Governance Risk measure ranging 
from 0 to 100 (high risk of financial misstatement) constructed from 
public information (refer to Price et al. 2011); 
 ln(ASSETS) = Natural logarithm of total assets; 
 ROA = Return on assets equal to income before extraordinary items divided by 
total assets; 
 LOSS = Indicator variable equal to one if a loss occurred within the current or 
previous two fiscal years, and 0 otherwise; 
 BTM = Book-to-market ratio; 
 SALES GROWTH = Percentage change in sales from the prior to the current year;  
 M&A = Indicator variable equal to one if a merger or acquisition occurred in 
prior five years, and 0 otherwise; 
 LEVERAGE = Financial leverage equal to total debt divided by total assets; 
 FINANCING = Indicator variable equal to one if the firm has an ex ante financing 
need, and 0 otherwise (refer to Dechow et al. 1996);  
 HERF = Herfindahl Index measuring industry concentration (refer to Bentley et 
al. 2012); 
 LITIGIOUS = Indicator variable equal to one if the company is in a litigious industry 
(refer to Bentley et al. 2012); 
 DAP = Discretionary accruals using a performance-adjusted modified Jones 
model (see Larcker and Richardson 2004); 
 BIGN = Indicator variable equal to one for Big N auditor, and 0 otherwise; 
 DED IO = Lagged value of a dedicated institutional investor variable (refer to 
Bentley et al. 2012); 
 STRATEGY = Archival business strategy measure developed by Bentley et al. 2012 
where high (middle) [low] scores represent Prospector (Analyzer) 
[Defender] strategies, respectively; 
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APPENDIX B 
SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
 
Survey part 1: Organizational business strategy 
Directions: These questions address the general strategies of your organization relative to competitors in your 
industry. Please answer the questions in terms of how things actually are in your organization not how you would 
prefer that they be. Consider your organization as a whole when answering these questions. Choose the statement that 
best describes your company‘s overarching strategy rather than a statement describing one particular business unit. 
Please be as candid as possible; all the information you provide is confidential and will be published only in summary, 
statistical form after being combined with all other survey participants' responses. Please fill out this survey in blue or 
black ink. 
 
Q-1   In comparison to our competitors, the products and/or services which we provide to our customers are   
         best characterized as:      
          
 Products and/or services which are more innovative, continually changing and broader in nature throughout the 
organization and marketplace. 
 Products and/or services which are fairly stable in certain units/departments and markets while innovative in 
other units/departments and markets. 
 Products and/or services which are well focused, relatively stable and consistently defined throughout the 
organization and marketplace. 
 Products and/or services which are in a state of transition, and largely based on responding to opportunities or 
threats from the marketplace or environment. 
 
Q-2   In contrast to our competitors, my organization has an image in the marketplace which:  
 
 Offers fewer, selective products and/or services which are high in quality. 
 Adopts new ideas and innovations but only after careful analysis. 
 Reacts to opportunities or threats in the marketplace to maintain or enhance our position. 
 Has a reputation for being innovative and creative. 
 
Q-3   The amount of time my organization spends on monitoring changes and trends in the marketplace can  
         best be described as:  
 
 Lengthy: We are continuously monitoring the marketplace. 
 Average: We spend a reasonable amount of time monitoring the marketplace. 
 Minimal: We really do not spend much time monitoring the marketplace. 
 Sporadic: We sometimes spend a great deal of time and at other times spend little time monitoring the 
marketplace. 
 
(The survey is continued on the next page.)
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Q-4   In comparison to our competitors, the increase or losses in demand which we have experienced are due  
         most probably to: 
 
 Our practice of concentrating on more fully developing those markets which we currently serve. 
 Our practice of responding to the pressures of the marketplace by taking few risks. 
 Our practice of aggressively entering into new markets with new types of products and/or services. 
 Our practice of assertively penetrating more deeply into markets we currently serve, while adopting new products 
and/or services only after a very careful review of their potential. 
 
Q-5   One of the most important goals in this organization, in comparison to our competitors, is our dedication  
         and commitment to: 
 
 Keep costs under control. 
 Analyze our costs and revenues carefully, to keep costs under control and to selectively generate new products 
and/or services or enter new markets. 
 Insure that people, resources and equipment required to develop new products and/or services and enter new 
markets are available and accessible. 
 Make sure that we guard against critical threats by taking whatever action is necessary. 
 
Q-6   In contrast to our competitors, the competencies (skills) which our managerial employees possess can best  
         be characterized as: 
 
 Analytical: Their skills enable them to both identify trends and develop new products and/or services or markets. 
 Specialized: Their skills are concentrated into one, or a few, specific areas. 
 Broad and entrepreneurial: Their skills are diverse, flexible and enable change to be created. 
 Fluid: Their skills are related to the near-term demands of the marketplace. 
 
Q-7   The one thing that protects my organization from our competitors is that we: 
 
 Are able to carefully analyze emerging trends and adopt only those which have proven potential. 
 Are able to do a limited number of things exceptionally well. 
 Are able to respond to trends even though they may possess only moderate potential as they arise. 
 Are able to consistently develop new products and/or services and new markets. 
 
Q-8   More so than many of our competitors, our management staff tends to concentrate on: 
 
 Maintaining a secure financial position through cost and quality control measures. 
 Analyzing opportunities in the marketplace and selecting only those opportunities with proven potential, while 
protecting a secure financial position. 
 Activities or business functions which most need attention given the opportunities or problems we currently 
confront. 
 Developing new products and/or services and expanding into new markets or market segments. 
 
(The survey is continued on the next page.)
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Q-9   In contrast to many of our competitors, my organization prepares for the future by: 
 
 Identifying the best possible solutions to those problems or challenges which require immediate attention. 
 Identifying trends and opportunities in the marketplace which can result in the creation of new product and/or 
service offerings which are new to the industry or which reach new markets. 
 Identifying those problems which, if solved, will maintain and then improve current our product and/or services 
offerings and market position. 
 Identifying those trends in the industry which our competitors have proven possess long-term potential while also 
solving problems related to our current product and/or service offerings and our current customers' needs. 
 
Q-10   In comparison to our competitors, the structure of my organization is: 
 
 Functional in nature:  Organized by department--marketing, accounting, personnel, etc. 
 Product, service or market oriented:  Product or service departments have marketing or accounting 
responsibilities, for example. 
 Primarily functional (departmental) in nature; however, a product and/or service or market oriented structure does 
exist in newer or larger product and/or service offering areas. 
 Continually changing to enable us to meet opportunities and solve problems as they arise. 
 
Q-11   Unlike many of our competitors, the procedures we use to evaluate our performance are best described  
            as: 
 
 Decentralized and participatory, encouraging many organizational members to be involved. 
 Heavily oriented toward reporting requirements which demand immediate attention. 
 Highly centralized and primarily the responsibility of senior management. 
 Centralized in more established product and/or service areas and more participatory in newer product and/or 
service areas. 
 
(Optional) If you have any other comments you would like to share related to your organization’s strategies, 
please indicate below: ____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
(The survey is continued on the next page.)
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Survey part 2: Organizational ethical climate and culture  
 Directions: Next are some questions about the general ethical climate and culture in your organization. Please answer 
the questions in terms of how things actually are in your organization, not how you would prefer that they be. Please 
be as candid as possible; all the information you provide is confidential and will be only published in summary, 
statistical form. 
Q-12   To what extent are the following statements true about your organization?  
 Completely 
False 
Mostly 
False 
Somewhat 
False 
Uncertain Somewhat 
True 
Mostly 
True 
Completely 
True 
In this company, people are 
mostly out for themselves. 
              
The major responsibility for 
people in this company is to 
consider efficiency first. 
              
In this company, people are 
expected to follow their own 
personal and moral beliefs. 
              
People are expected to do 
anything to further the 
company's interests. 
              
In this company, people 
look out for each other's 
good. 
              
There is no room for one's 
own personal morals or 
ethics in this company. 
              
It is very important to 
follow strictly the 
company's rules and 
procedures. 
              
Work is considered sub-
standard only when it hurts 
the company's interests. 
              
Each person in this 
company decides for 
himself/ herself what is right 
and wrong. 
              
In this company, people 
protect their own interest 
above other considerations. 
              
The most important 
consideration in this 
company is each person's 
sense of right and wrong. 
              
The most important concern 
is the good of all the people 
in this company. 
              
 
(The survey is continued on the next page.)
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Q-13   To what extent are the following statements true about your organization?  
 
 Completely 
False 
Mostly 
False 
Somewhat 
False 
Uncertain Somewhat 
True 
Mostly 
True 
Completely 
True 
The first consideration is 
whether a decision violates 
any law. 
              
People are expected to 
comply with the law and 
professional standards over 
and above other 
considerations. 
              
Everyone is expected to 
stick by company rules and 
procedures. 
              
In this company, our major 
concerns is always what is 
best for the other person. 
              
People are concerned with 
the company's interests, to 
the exclusion of all else. 
              
Successful people in this 
company go by the book. 
              
The most efficient way is 
always the right way, in this 
company. 
              
In this company, people are 
expected to strictly follow 
legal or professional 
standards. 
              
Our major consideration is 
what is best for everyone in 
the company. 
              
In this company, people are 
guided by their own 
personal ethics. 
              
Successful people in this 
company strictly obey the 
company policies. 
              
In this company, the law or 
ethical code of their 
profession is the major 
consideration. 
              
 
(The survey is continued on the next page.)
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Q-14   To what extent are the following statements true about your organization?  
 
 Completely 
False 
Mostly 
False 
Somewhat 
False 
Uncertain Somewhat 
True 
Mostly 
True 
Completely 
True 
In this company, each 
person is expected, above 
all, to work efficiently. 
              
It is expected that you will 
always do what is right for 
the customer and public. 
              
People in this company 
view team spirit as 
important. 
              
People in this company have 
a strong sense of 
responsibility to the outside 
community. 
              
Decisions here are primarily 
viewed in terms of 
contribution to profit. 
              
People in this company are 
actively concerned about the 
customer's, and the public's 
interest. 
              
People are very concerned 
about what is generally best 
for employees in the 
company. 
              
What is best for each 
individual is a primary 
concern in this company. 
              
People in this company are 
very concerned about what 
is best for themselves. 
              
The effect of decisions on 
the customer and the public 
are a primary concern in this 
company. 
              
It is expected that each 
individual is cared for when 
making decisions here. 
              
Efficient solutions to 
problems are always sought 
here. 
              
 
(The survey is continued on the next page.)
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Q15 (a)   Does your organization have a written code of ethics? 
 
 Yes 
 No 
 Unsure 
 
 
 
Q-15 (b)   To what extent are the following statements true about your organization? 
 
 Completely 
False 
Mostly 
False 
Somewhat 
False 
Uncertain Somewhat 
True 
Mostly 
True 
Completely 
True 
Employees are required to 
acknowledge that they have 
read and understood the 
ethics code. 
              
The organization has 
established procedures for 
employees to ask questions 
about ethics code 
requirements. 
              
The code of conduct is 
widely distributed 
throughout the organization. 
              
Employees are regularly 
required to assert that their 
actions are in compliance 
with the ethics code. 
              
Employees in this 
organization perceive that 
people who violate the 
ethics code still get formal 
organizational rewards. 
              
The ethics code serves as 
"window dressing" only in 
this organization. 
              
The ethics code serves only 
to maintain the 
organization's public image. 
              
Ethics code requirements 
are consistent with informal 
organizational norms. 
              
 
(The survey is continued on the next page.)
IF YOU ANSWER NO OR UNSURE SKIP TO Q-16 ON 
NEXT PAGE 
IF YOU ANSWER YES PROCEED TO Q-15 (b) 
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 Q-16   To what extent are the following statements true about your company? 
 
 Completely 
False 
Mostly 
False 
Somewhat 
False 
Uncertain Somewhat 
True 
Mostly 
True 
Completely 
True 
Management in this 
organization disciplines 
unethical behavior when it 
occurs. 
              
Penalties for unethical 
behavior are strictly 
enforced in this organization 
              
Unethical behavior is 
punished in this 
organization. 
              
Top management of this 
organization represents high 
ethical standards. 
              
People of integrity are 
rewarded in this 
organization. 
              
Top management of this 
organization regularly 
shows that they care about 
ethics. 
              
Top management of this 
organization is a model of 
unethical behavior. 
              
Ethical behavior is the norm 
in this organization. 
              
Top management of this 
organization guides decision 
making in an ethical 
direction. 
              
Ethical behavior is rewarded 
in this organization. 
              
This organization demands 
obedience to authority 
figures, without question. 
              
People in this organization 
are expected to do as they 
are told. 
              
The boss is always right in 
this organization. 
              
 
(The survey is continued on the next page.)
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(Optional) If you have any other comments you would like to share related to your organization's ethical 
climate or culture, please indicate below: __________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Survey conclusion: Demographics 
 Directions: Finally, these questions relate to you for statistical purposes. Please be as candid as possible; all the 
information you provide is confidential and will be published only in summary, statistical form. 
Q-17   Please indicate your degree of confidence in answering the questions on the previous sections of the    
survey: 
                                                                                  Not Confident                                                         Very Confident 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Part 1: Organizational Business Strategy                       
Part 2: Organizational Ethical Culture/Climate                       
 
 
Q-18   Please indicate your degree of agreement or disagreement with the following statements: 
 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagr
ee 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Uncertain Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Generally speaking, I am 
satisfied with this job. 
              
I talk up this company to my 
friends as a great company 
to work for. 
              
I find that my values and the 
company's values are very 
similar. 
              
Religion is important to me 
in my daily life. 
              
 
Q-19   Your gender: 
 
 Male 
 Female 
 
Q-20   Your age range: 
 
 Less than 30 
 30 to 39 
 40 to 49 
 50 to 59 
 More than 60 
 
(The survey is continued on the next page.)
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Q-21   Which is the highest level of education that you have completed? 
 
 High school degree 
 Undergraduate degree 
 Master degree 
 Doctorate degree 
 
Q-22   Are you a U.S. citizen? 
 
 Yes 
 No 
 
Q-23   How long have you been employed with this company (and not just in the current position)? 
 
 Less than 1 year 
 1 to less than 3 years 
 3 years to less than 5 years 
 5 years to less than10 years 
 More than 10 years 
 
Q-24   What department/ position responsibilities are you most closely associated with in the company? 
 
 Accounting 
 Finance 
 Management 
 Marketing 
 Other: ____________________ 
 
Q-25   What is your approximate level/ position in the company? 
 
 Staff/ assistant/ administrator 
 Director/ manager/ supervisor 
 Executive officer/ corporate officer/ senior executive 
 
Q-26 What is the approximate number of employees in your company? 
 
 Less than100 employees 
 100 to less than 500 employees 
 500 to less than 1,000 employees 
 1,000 to less than 10,000 employees 
 More than 10,000 employees 
 
 (The survey is continued on the next page.)
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Q-27 What is the approximate current revenue of your company? 
 
 Less than $1 million 
 $1 million to less than $100 million 
 $100 million to less than $500 million 
 $500 million to less than $1 billion 
 $1 billion to less than $10 billion 
 More than $10 billion 
 
Q-28 What is the primary industry of your company? 
 
 Business services 
 Construction, mining and agriculture 
 Education 
 Finance 
 Government 
 Healthcare 
 High tech 
 Insurance 
 Manufacturing 
 Media and entertainment 
 Nonprofit 
 Pharmaceuticals and biotechnology 
 Real estate 
 Transportation, communications and utilities 
 Wholesale/ retail 
 Other ____________________ 
 
Q-29 Is your organization a publicly listed company? 
 
 Yes 
 No 
 
 
Note: 
The survey instrument questions regarding organizational business strategy, ethical climate and culture questions are 
based on Conant et al. (1990), Cullen, Parboteeah, and Victor (2003), and Treviño et al. (1998), respectively. 
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APPENDIX C 
FACTOR LOADINGS 
 
Panel A: Ethical climate factor loadings for Internet sample (N=512)   
Construct Items Factor Loadings Cronbach 
Alpha   1 2 3 4 
  EGOISM In this company, people are mostly out for themselves. (EL1) -0.331 -0.105 0.735 -0.161 0.825 
In this company, people protect their own interest above other considerations. (EI10) -0.252 -0.071 0.742 -0.185 
People in this company are very concerned about what is best for themselves. (EI33) -0.140 -0.010 0.662 -0.123 
People are expected to do anything to further the company‘s interests. (EL4) -0.005 -0.136 0.596 -0.033 
Work is considered sub-standard only when it hurts the company‘s interests. (EL8) -0.048 -0.121 0.569 -0.099 
BENV-
CARING 
In this company, people look out for each other‘s good. (BI5) 0.634 0.159 -0.345 0.151 0.892 
In this company, our major concern is always what is best for the other person. (BI16) 0.544 0.204 -0.036 0.229 
What is best for each individual is a primary concern in this company. (BI32) 0.636 0.115 0.078 0.200 
It is expected that each individual is cared for when making decisions here. (BI35) 0.727 0.168 -0.169 0.263 
The most important concern is the good of all the people in this company. (BL12) 0.764 0.107 -0.164 0.033 
Our major consideration is what is best for everyone in the company. (BL21) 0.737 0.207 -0.130 0.061 
People in this company view team spirit as important. (BL27) 0.509 0.120 -0.280 0.354 
People are very concerned about what is generally best for employees in the company. 
(BL31) 
0.671 0.158 -0.211 0.247 
BENV-
SOCIAL 
It is expected that you will always do what is right for the customer and public. (BC26) 0.190 0.234 -0.175 0.694 0.856 
 People in this company have a strong sense of responsibility to the outside community. 
(BC28) 
0.311 0.206 -0.241 0.545  
 People in this company are actively concerned about the customer‘s, and the public‘s 
interest. (BC30) 
0.252 0.153 -0.164 0.738  
 The effect of decisions on the customer and the public is a primary concern in this 
company. (BC34) 
0.262 0.219 -0.112 0.704  
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Appendix C (Continued)   
Construct Items Factor Loadings Cronbach  
  1 2 3 4 Alpha 
  PRINCIPLE  It is very important to follow strictly the company‘s rules and procedures. (PL7) 0.128 0.634 -0.066 0.063 0.874 
 Everyone is expected to stick by company rules and procedures. (PL15) 0.056 0.774 -0.061 0.070 
 Successful people in this company go by the book. (PL18) 0.262 0.627 0.004 -0.010 
 Successful people in this company strictly obey the company policies. (PL23) 0.252 0.662 -0.073 0.027 
 The first consideration is whether a decision violates any law. (PC13) 0.148 0.548 -0.104 0.157 
 People are expected to comply with the law/professional standards above other 
considerations. (PC14) 
0.075 0.698 -0.098 0.280 
 In this company, people are expected to strictly follow legal or professional standards. 
(PC20) 
0.062 0.670 -0.177 0.217 
 In this company, the law or ethical code of their profession is the major consideration. 
(PC24) 
0.122 0.607 -0.120 0.289 
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Notes:  
*Factor loadings are not applicable in the full Internet sample since this sample contains organizations with and without ethics codes; code implementation questions are 
only applicable for the archival-linked sample of where all the public companies have written ethics codes. 
 
Refer to Appendix B for the full copy of the survey which is based on Cullen et al. 2003 and Treviño et al. 1998. Participants rate the extent to which each statement is 
true about their organization on a 7-point Likert scale. Using the principle-axis factoring method and Varimax rotation, items from the questionnaire are 
removed if factor loadings are below 0.50 and/ cross loadings exceed 0.40. Item coding is omitted on the survey instrument. 
Appendix C (Continued) 
 
  
Panel B: Ethical culture factor loadings for Internet sample (N=512)   
Construct Items Factor Loadings Cronbach 
  1 2 Alpha 
  ENVIRONMENT Management in this organization disciplines unethical behavior when it occurs. (EE5) 0.765 
 
-0.056 
 
0.920 
Penalties for unethical behavior are strictly enforced in this organization. (EE6) 0.718 
 
-0.048 
 
 
Unethical behavior is punished in this organization. (EE7) 0.666 
 
0.007 
 
 
Top management of this organization represents high ethical standards. (EE8) 0.680 
 
-0.131 
 
 
People of integrity are rewarded in this organization. (EE9) 0.739 
 
-0.215 
 
 
Top management of this organization regularly shows that they care about ethics. (EE10) 0.811 
 
-0.189 
 
 
Top management of this organization is a model of unethical behavior (reverse-coded). (EE11) 0.541 
 
-0.266 
 
 
Ethical behavior is the norm in this organization. (EE12) 0.793 
 
-0.182 
 
 
Top management of this organization guides decision making in an ethical direction. (EE13) 0.828 
 
-0.125 
 
 
Ethical behavior is rewarded in this organization. (EE14) 0.683 
 
-0.154 
 
 
  OBEDIENCE This organization demands obedience to authority figures, without question. (OTA1) -0.137 
 
0.713 
 
0.775 
People in this organization are expected to do as they are told. (OTA2) -0.009 
 
0.653 
 
 
The boss is always right in this organization. (OTA3) -0.206 
 
0.695 
 
 
IMPLEMENT* Employees are required to acknowledge that they have read and understood the ethics code. (IMP1) n/a 
 
n/a 
 
 
 This organization has established procedures for employees to ask questions about ethics code 
requirements. (IMP2) 
n/a 
 
n/a 
 
 
 The code of conduct is widely distributed throughout the organization. (IMP3) n/a 
 
n/a 
 
 
 Employees are regularly required to asset that their actions are in compliance with the ethics code. 
(IMP4) 
n/a 
 
n/a 
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Significant correlations (p<0.05) are indicated in bold. 
*IMPLEMENT (CODE) is applicable to the archival-linked (Internet) sample only. 
